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SB 7: A UNION PERSPECTIVE 
By, Mitchell Roth 
Mitchell Roth has been General Counsel for the Illinois Education Association-NEA since September 
1988.  IEA Executive Director Audrey Soglin and he represented the IEA in the SB 7  negotiations.  As 
general counsel, Mitch has administered a legal services program for over 130,000 members and over 
1,000 affiliates, managed an outstanding staff of 20 employees, overseen cases handled by top-notch 
in-house attorneys and 10 outside law firms, advised IEA and local affiliates on legal, corporate and 
governance matters, and represented and assisted others with IEA on thousands of legislative and other 
policy matters.  In doing this work, he has had the great fortune of working for individuals engaged in 
the most critical profession – public education.  He has been able to do so with some of the most 
outstanding and progressive union, management and government leaders. But none of his work would 
have been possible without the support and balance brought by his family – Wilma, Ben, Nate and 
Natalie, of whom he could not be prouder, and by his love of music.  Prior to coming to IEA, Mitch was 
Staff Counsel for the National Education Association.   His educational background is: University of 
Wisconsin Law School; Cornell University masters’ program in labor relations; Princeton University 
undergraduate. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The narrative is steady. The narrative is loud.  It cares little about actions that do 
not fit it or evidence that does not support it.  “Teachers’ unions are, generally 
speaking, a menace and an impediment to [education] reform.”[1]To some, “The 
teachers’ unions are the main reason why the quarter-century-long movement to 
reform this nation’s schools has been such a disappointment.”[2] The narrative can 
certainly find support in some teachers’ unions which have been resistant to 
change, most often when change has been done around rather than with unions 
and their members.  However, the narrative conveniently ignores that the lack of 
success of some education reform initiatives is much more complex than whether 
teachers’ unions have supported or opposed them.[3] It also ignores that some 
teachers’ “unions have actually been at the forefront of educational reform 
efforts.”[4] When teachers’ unions and their members have a voice in 
collaboratively developing and implementing systemic reforms, improved student 
performance often follows.[5] For, as Bill Gates observed, “[i]f reforms aren’t 
shaped by teachers’ knowledge and experience, they’re not going to succeed.”[6] 
In no state has this narrative been shown to be so misleading, so “sorely 
outdated,”[7] than in Illinois. The most striking example undercutting it occurred 
on June 13, 2011, in a packed auditorium at Lexington Elementary School in 
Maywood, when Gov. Pat Quinn signed SB 7/HB 1197, legislation which 
“overhauled state policies on teacher hiring, tenure, reductions in force, and 
dismissal.”[8] In attendance were representatives from almost every major 
education group in the state, including both the Illinois Education Association 
(IEA) and Illinois Federation of Teachers (IFT), most all of whom had taken part 
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in numerous collaborative meetings over a five and a half month period.  Described 
as a “sweeping measure that has the potential to significantly reshape the teaching 
profession,”[9] it was brought about by “education stakeholders [who] 
accomplished something outstanding,” resulting in Illinois being “a national 
model for how to operate real change through close collaboration, education, and 
advocacy.”[10] As United States Secretary of Education Arne Duncan put it: 
“Through this very impressive collaboration of school management, teacher 
unions, education reform advocates, legislators and the governor, Illinois has 
created a powerful framework to strengthen the teaching profession and advance 
student learning in Illinois.  This is an example that I hope states across the country 
will follow.”[11] 
At its core, SB 7 elevates the role of teacher performance in major employment 
decisions; maintains recognition that seniority still should matter in making these 
decisions; streamlines the process for dismissing teachers, particularly when based 
on higher quality, more objective evaluations; and adds a dose of public scrutiny 
— and thus reality — to the bargaining process.  But as important as its substance, 
and in many ways inseparable from it, is the collaborative process by which the 
legislation was crafted, the success of which was due to several factors: 
 The skilled facilitation and focus of Senator Kimberly Lightford, assistant 
majority leader and vice chair of the Senate Education Committee and 
Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) General Counsel Darren Reisberg; 
 The shared purpose of all involved to “do what’s in the best interest of our 
kids;”[12] 
 An historic coalition of the three major teacher unions (IEA, IFT and the 
Chicago Teachers Union (CTU)), each of which were not new to education 
reform and had been working for many years on evolving their positions on 
such issues; 
 Prior education reform legislation that established a solid foundation from 
which many of the SB 7 reforms could be built; and 
 The strong relationships of those who participated in the process; 
relationships built on trust, respect, knowledge and experience. 
This article will examine this process throughout discussion of the major 
substantive provisions included in SB 7, from my perspective as one of the 
participants from the IEA.  I hope it adds to the understanding of what the 
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language of SB 7 means, what the intent behind the language is, and how strong, 
high quality advocates can truly work together to achieve meaningful public policy. 
II. UNDERPINNINGS OF SB 7 
A quarter-century ago, several individuals[13] in the suburban Chicago area who 
were deeply concerned about the gaps in student performance in Illinois and the 
systems in public schools inhibiting positive change, created an education reform 
organization. That organization has spent the last 25 years significantly affecting 
the academic lives of tens of thousands of school children in hundreds of schools 
around the state.  Founded in 1987, the Consortium for Educational Change (CEC), 
a non-profit organization affiliated with the IEA,[14] has worked with teachers, 
school and school district administrators, school boards and teacher unions to 
improve student learning and achievement.[15] Today, CEC has more than 80 
school district members, covering virtually all areas of Illinois, from Antioch 
Community Consolidated School District 34 in the very northern part of the state, 
to Cairo School District No. 1 in the very southern part of the state.[16] The CEC 
assists and supports school districts, schools and their teachers’ unions as they go 
through the process of systemic change needed to improve teaching and student 
performance.[17] 
The IFT and CTU have similar education reform histories.  In 1989, the CTU 
Development Center for Restructuring was established for its members, parents, 
administrators and community leaders to work on implementing reform 
legislation.[18] In 1990, IFT held its first QuEST (Quality Education Standards in 
Teaching) conference and in 1992 the CTU Quest Center, the education reform arm 
of the CTU, was established.[19] All three unions have provided extensive 
professional development opportunities for their members, in conjunction with 
their involvement in education reform issues.[20] 
In 2005, a group of Illinois leaders from business, politics, education and labor, 
referred to as the “Education Policy Dialogue Group,” began meeting to discuss 
statewide strategies on how best to raise student achievement.[21]Its discussions 
led to the creation of the “Burnham Plan for a World-Class Education,” which was 
released in May 2007.  Applauded by many, including the generally anti-
labor Chicago Tribune,[22] the Burnham Plan called for such education reforms 
as: a better data system to measure student gains and determine teacher and 
principal effectiveness, a streamlined process for dismissing poorly performing 
teachers, financial rewards for excellent teachers and schools, intensive induction 
and mentoring programs for teachers and principals, training for school board 
members, and expansion of the number of charter schools permitted in 
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Illinois.[23] During the summer of 2007[24] and the spring of 2008,[25] many 
parts of the Burnham Plan were incorporated into bills that, in the end, did not 
pass the General Assembly.  Undeterred, the group refined the original Burnham 
Plan and, in anticipation of the federal Race to the Top (RTTT) program, developed 
“Burnham 2.0,”[26] which “urge[d] immediate changes in how Illinois education 
does business.”[27] The work this group did, the progressive concepts around 
which it coalesced and the relationships its members developed set the stage for 
education reform initiatives to come. 
On July 24, 2009, after some delay, the United States Department of Education 
(DoEd) officially issued its proposed RTTT competitive grant guidelines.  The $4.3 
billion in RTTT monies was part of almost $100 billion in grants and bonding 
authority appropriated to the DoEd as part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). The RTTT grant criteria focused on four areas: 
1. Adopting world-class standards and assessments to measure student 
achievement against them; 
2. Establishing effective data systems to track student growth and link it to the 
performance of teachers, principals and ultimately teacher training 
programs; 
3. Getting the best teachers and principals into the highest-poverty schools and 
hardest-to-staff subjects; and 
4. Focusing resources on the lowest-achieving 5 percent of schools.[28] 
Even before the official guidelines were released, State Superintendent of 
Education Chris Koch began to bring together statewide education groups to 
discuss how to enhance Illinois’ chances to receive up to $400 million in RTTT 
grants.  The grants would be awarded in two phases:  Phase 1 for which 
applications would be due in late 2009/early 2010 and Phase 2 for which 
applications would be due sometime in 2010. A focus of these discussions was how 
to improve the state’s teacher evaluation system[29] that many believed was 
ineffective, subjective, and poorly implemented.[30] Under the RTTT guidelines, 
states incorporating measurements of student growth[31]into both their teacher 
and principal evaluation systems received higher ratings than states that did 
not.[32] While the unions generally were not happy with the existing teacher 
evaluation system, they had concerns about using student growth assessments for 
high-stakes employment decisions when many researchers were unconvinced of 
their reliability and validity.[33] In late November 2009, DoEd issued its final 
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RTTT guidelines and application.[34] At that point, the decision was made that 
Illinois would apply in the first phase of RTTT grants.[35] 
Over the next several weeks, legislators, led by Senator Kimberly Lightford and 
state Representatives Roger Eddy and Linda Chapa La Via, representatives from 
the governor’s office,  ISBE, the IEA, IFT, CTU, the Illinois School Management 
Alliance (which is made up of the Illinois Association of School Boards (IASB), the 
Illinois Association of School Administrators (IASA), the Illinois Principals 
Association (IPA) and the Illinois Association of School Business Officials 
(IASBO)), the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) and Advance Illinois,[36] worked 
diligently and collaboratively to craft a bill to improve teacher and principal 
evaluations that would enhance Illinois’ chances to receive RTTT funds.[37] On 
Jan. 15, 2010, in time to be included in Illinois’ RTTT application, the Performance 
Evaluation Reform Act (PERA)[38] was signed by the governor and became 
law.[39] 
PERA makes several significant changes to teacher evaluations.  First, it requires 
that all school districts incorporate measures of student growth into their teachers’ 
evaluations.[40] While CPS is required to do this by the 2012-2013 school year in 
300 of its schools and by 2013-2014 in the remainder of its schools, other Illinois’ 
school districts will be required to begin using student growth evaluations by either 
the 2015-2016 school year (for the lowest performing 20 percent)[41] or the 2016-
2017 school year (for the remainder of school districts).[42] When a school district 
must begin using student growth measures as part of a teacher’s evaluation is 
called the district’s “PERA Implementation Date.”[43] This phase-in requirement 
helped alleviate some concerns IEA and others had about the implementation of 
student-growth teacher evaluation measures before enough research was 
conducted and experience gained on the validity and reliability of such 
measures.[44] Second, beginning September 1, 2012, all evaluators must 
successfully complete a pre-qualification program provided by or through ISBE 
before they can conduct a valid evaluation.[45] This requirement addressed 
concerns IEA and others had that a certain level of evaluation skills should be 
required.  Third, since 1985 when the teacher evaluation law was first enacted, 
school districts have had to, at a minimum, work in good faith with their teachers’ 
unions in developing their teacher evaluation plans.  PERA not only includes in 
this requirement developing a plan on how student growth measures will be used 
as a significant factor in evaluating their teachers, it specifically requires that 
districts use “a joint committee composed of equal representation selected by the 
district and its teachers or, where applicable, [its teachers’ union]” in doing 
so.[46] PERA specifies what, at a minimum, a school district’s student growth 
evaluation plan must include.[47] For those parts of the plan on which the joint 
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committee cannot reach agreement, the school district is required to follow what 
the State has established,[48] as opposed to allowing the district to implement its 
position on the issue.[49] The IEA and other unions believe that this process 
provides teachers with a more meaningful voice in the creation of the student 
growth evaluation plan than would otherwise have existed under the IELRA, where 
the substance of evaluations are permissive subjects of bargaining and thus can be 
unilaterally determined by school districts.[50] 
By creating a more objective evaluation system, in which teachers and their unions 
would have more significant and meaningful input, PERA and the collaborative 
process used to develop it established a stronger foundation for both the IEA and 
IFT to progressively address other education reform issues.  And while both unions 
were keenly aware of developments in other states concerning teacher dismissals, 
layoffs, pay for performance and tenure,[51]and were engaging their members in 
conversations about all of those issues, the timeline in which they would need to 
address these issues was a little shorter than expected. 
III. PERFORMANCE COUNTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ALL 
During the summer of 2010, Stand for Children (SFC),[52] an Oregon-based 
school reform group, made its appearance in Illinois.  Fresh off its success in 
Colorado, where it aggressively and quickly pushed through legislation making 
significant changes to teacher tenure, dismissal and layoffs, [53] SFC believed it 
had an opportunity[54] to do the same thing in Illinois.  The IEA, IFT and other 
groups watched SFC establish itself here.  In September 2010, SFC formed a 
political action committee which, by the beginning of October, had amassed and 
distributed more than $600,000 to six Democratic and three Republican state 
House candidates in the November 2010 election.[55] On December 3, 2010, 
Speaker of the Illinois House Michael Madigan announced the creation of the 
bipartisan eight-member Special House Committee on Education Reform for the 
96th General Assembly,[56]which would hold subject matter hearings on 
December 16 and 17, 2010.  The Democrats on the committee were state 
Representatives Linda Chapa La Via, as co-chair, and Keith Farnham, Jehan 
Gordon,[57] and Karen Yarborough; the Republicans on the committee were 
Representatives Roger Eddy, as co-chair, and Robert Pritchard, Darlene Senger 
and Edward Sullivan.[58] On December 8, 2010, the Illinois Senate created its own 
Special Committee on Education Reform.  Named to that committee were 
Democratic Senators Kimberly Lightford, co-chair, and Edward Maloney, and 
Republican Senators Bradley Burzynski, co-chair, and David Luechtefeld.[59] 
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A little over a week after the House committee was created, a coalition of groups, 
headed by SFC and Advance Illinois, and including the Illinois Business 
Roundtable[60] and the Civic Committee of the Commercial Club of 
Chicago,[61] formally released draft legislation entitled the “Performance Counts 
Act of 2010” (PC).[62] Many of the PC proposals (all of which focused on K-12 
public education) formed the basis of testimony at the House committee 
hearings.  Among the proposals were: 
1. Revocation of a teacher’s or principal’s certificate for three unsatisfactory 
evaluations in a 10-year period; 
2. Selection of teachers to fill new or vacant positions in a school based on merit, 
as determined solely by the school principal or district superintendent in 
accordance with school board policies, and limiting the use of seniority in the 
selection process to a discretionary tiebreaker; 
3. Acquisition of tenure by a teacher based on four satisfactory or better 
performance evaluations over an indefinite number of years; 
4. Layoff of teachers based on a process developed by the school district, in 
consultation but not through bargaining with the union, in which 
a. prior performance, as determined by the district (with performance 
evaluations being the predominant factor in determining prior 
performance) controlled who would be laid off and 
b. seniority could only be considered as a tie-breaker; 
5. No recall rights for teachers who were laid off (laid off teachers could apply 
and would be considered first by the district); 
6. A tenured teacher dismissal process for unsatisfactory performance where 
a. the teacher could appeal her dismissal to a school district panel made 
up of two district representatives and one union representative, 
b. the teacher and school district would each have two days to present 
their case at the hearing and 
c. the burden would be on the teacher to show that the evaluation on 
which the dismissal was based was not valid or appropriate; 
7. Prior to being able to strike, a union would have to go through an elongated 
fact-finding[63] process with a strike allowed only if the school board did not 
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accept its own final offer presented to the fact-finder, the fact-finder’s 
recommendation or the union’s final offer; 
8. Loss of payroll deduction and IELRB certification for a union engaging in an 
illegal strike; and 
9. Changing many mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining in Chicago 
to prohibited subjects of bargaining.[64] 
The message accompanying these proposals was that PC was on a fast track, and 
that the intent was to pass major education reform legislation before the 96th 
General Assembly adjourned on Jan. 11, 2011. 
Needless to say, while the IEA and IFT had worked with others in thoughtfully 
developing and implementing reforms, the extreme nature and aggressiveness of 
the PC proposals, and the expeditious process by which they were intended to be 
considered, left the clear message that those who developed and supported PC 
intended to ram it through the General Assembly in the first week of January 2011, 
with minimal if any modification.[65] However, the PC coalition wasn’t the only 
coalition on the block.  As described earlier in this article, even before PC was 
released, the IEA, IFT and CTU had worked together on education reform and 
other issues.  The leadership of all three organizations, IEA President Ken Swanson 
and Executive Director Audrey Soglin, IFT President Dan Montgomery, and CTU 
President Karen Lewis[66], realized that they clearly needed to coalesce their 
efforts in addressing the PC proposal.  Together they prepared for and testified at 
the December 16 and 17, 2010 House committee hearings, articulating their strong 
concerns with much of the PC proposal, and arguing that more time was needed to 
thoughtfully and collaboratively develop effective reform legislation.[67] Over the 
next two weeks, the three unions mobilized their membership to contact 
legislators, conducted member surveys and met with each other numerous times. 
Based on internal discussions, organizational policies and positions and research 
by others outside their organizations, they crafted and released, on January 3, 
2011, draft legislation which they believed was “an important step forward to 
guaranteeing that schools, districts, and the state share[d] responsibility for 
student success.”[68] Entitled “Accountability for All” (AFA), the unions’ plan 
proposed, among other things, the following: 
1. Mandate training of school board members on education and labor law, 
financial oversight and fiduciary responsibilities; 
2. Review and recommend comprehensive changes to the Illinois Student 
Report Card; 
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3. Develop rules regarding how multiple unsatisfactory performance 
evaluations for teachers and administrators completed under PERA would 
affect teaching certificates; 
4. Implement and fund rigorous new teacher induction and mentoring 
programs in school districts; 
5. Give equal weight to performance evaluations completed under PERA and 
seniority in filling new and vacant teaching positions through a process jointly 
developed by a school district and union; 
6. Give equal weight to performance evaluations completed under PERA and 
seniority in laying off and recalling teachers, with teacher salary and benefits 
prohibited from being considered through a process jointly developed by 
school district and union; 
7. Streamline the tenured teacher dismissal process, but maintain appeal to an 
independent hearing officer to make the dismissal decision; 
8. Provide tenure to a teacher based on three satisfactory or better performance 
evaluations completed under PERA in a four-year probationary period, with 
a. tenure granted in three years if all of a teacher’s evaluations have been 
satisfactory or better and 
b. tenure granted in two years if all of a teacher’s evaluations have been 
satisfactory or better and she had attained tenure in a prior school 
district; 
9. Require a school district to reemploy a non-tenured teacher who received an 
excellent evaluation; 
10. Require written reasons for not reemploying a non-tenured teacher who 
received a satisfactory or better evaluation; and 
11. Create a student bill of rights requiring a qualified teacher in every classroom 
on day one of a school year, and a rich curriculum for every student.[69] 
Despite the unions’ involvement in education reform initiatives and legislation 
over the years, AFA’s release surprised many, not only because the unions had 
come together behind it, but also because of the proposal’s substance.  The unions 
and their membership showed that they were ready to engage in discussions 
regarding the role of performance in layoffs and tenure.[70] They also provided 
legislators and others who understood the complexity of these education reform 
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issues and believed that teachers’ voices had to be heard in order to most effectively 
address them with the support they needed.[71] 
On the day AFA was released, the Senate Special Committee on Education Reform, 
co-chaired by Senator Lightford, held its first hearing on the PC legislation.  The 
three unions testified at that hearing, sharing the substance of their education 
reform proposal and imploring that time be taken to thoughtfully and 
collaboratively process the very important issues raised.  Senator Lightford, who 
had actively led negotiations on several education reform matters over a number 
of years, also believed that the process needed to be slowed, and that all interested 
parties needed to be brought to the table, with the goal of producing legislation for 
the Spring 2011 General Assembly session. Due to her efforts, the unions’ work in 
developing AFA and the activism of their members, PC was not passed before the 
96th General Assembly adjourned on January 11, 2011.[72] 
IV. INTENSE NEGOTIATIONS BRING RESULTS 
The stage was now set for several months of intense work.  Under Senator 
Lightford’s leadership, the Senate special committee held approximately 10 
meetings, attended by representatives from most major education groups in the 
state.[73] ISBE General Counsel Darren Reisberg, who worked closely with 
Senator Lightford and the Senate special committee, also held regular meetings 
attended by a smaller group, where more in depth discussions occurred on 
issues.  Additionally, a core group of attorneys consisting of Reisberg, Jon Furr, 
former ISBE general counsel and partner in the law firm of Holland & Knight, 
representing the PC Coalition, IASA General Counsel Sara Boucek, representing 
school management, and IEA General Counsel Mitchell Roth, representing the 
three unions, devoted hundreds of hours to working through issues too complex to 
resolve in larger group discussions and drafting legislative language reflecting 
agreements which had been reached.[74] Underlying all the work done were scores 
of meetings and conference calls, in which each coalition, whether it was the 
unions, PC or school management, internally processed, honed and crafted their 
positions. 
By mid-April, agreement was reached on a wide range of issues, from changes to 
the State School Report Card[75] to teacher layoffs to bargaining impasse 
procedures.  The ability for all to come together was a testament to several 
factors.  First, it was the driving passion of Senator Lightford to do what is best for 
public school students.[76] This has been her focus, both legislatively and 
personally, for many years.[77] To achieve this, she has consistently followed her 
belief that those who work in the schools know best how to make them work.  To 
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the unions and their members, this means that she has always made sure that their 
voices are heard and their expertise considered.  Having her spearhead these 
discussions, with the support of Senate Pres. John Cullerton, gave them certainty 
that the process would be fair.  Second, she and Mr. Reisberg kept the work of the 
groups focused, politically realistic and moving forward. As one commentator 
observed, Senator “Lightford was not shy about pushing back when she thought 
any party was overreaching, and over the course of the process, she forced each of 
the parties to back down from initial positions.”[78] 
Third, for the unions, the work they had done over the years on other education 
reform initiatives and in engaging their memberships in discussions which evolved 
their positions on many critical issues, provided the flexibility to find common 
ground.  Fourth, most everyone realized that some type of agreement had to be 
reached,[79] and that holding intractable positions would likely lead to legislation 
which would be harder for their constituencies to accept. Fifth, as discussed earlier, 
the creation of a stronger and fairer performance evaluation system under PERA 
provided the unions with a solid base from which to agree to new ways, in 
particular, of handling teacher layoffs.  Sixth, the relationships that had been built 
over the years between individuals who played critical roles in the negotiations 
were key. From prior experience in working on other education legislation, they 
respected each other’s intellectual honesty and integrity.  They knew they could 
trust each other while having open conversations about possible solutions to 
complex issues.  They all shared the same goal: to accomplish something that 
would in practice improve public education in the state.  Without this, they would 
not have been able to reach the agreements they did.[80] 
On April 14 and 15, 2011, the Illinois Senate passed the agreed-upon 
legislation.[81] The legislation addressed the following issues: Survey of learning 
conditions in every school; school board member training; action regarding a 
teacher or administrator certificate for incompetency; filling of new and vacant 
teaching positions; acquisition of tenure; layoff (reduction in force) of teachers; 
tenured teacher dismissal procedures; scope of bargaining in CPS; impasse 
procedures; and the right to strike, including the membership vote need for CTU 
to strike.  Over the following several weeks, as the Illinois House prepared to 
consider the legislation, a number of problems arose, including whether the House 
might seek to amend the bill.[82] Some of the language drafted at the eleventh 
hour did not accurately reflect what the parties had understood they agreed 
to.[83] Further negotiations, particularly between CPS and CTU representatives, 
resolved these problems, resulting in SB 7 being passed by the House without any 
changes on May 12, 2011,[84] followed on May 31, 2011, by HB 1197,[85] which 
14  ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT SPRING 2012 
 
 
addressed the problems which had arisen.[86] On June 13, 2011, Governor Quinn 
signed both bills.[87] 
V. SB 7: LAYOFFS, IMPASSE PROCEDURES AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, TENURED 
TEACHER DISMISSAL AND ACQUISITION OF TENURE 
While SB 7 makes multiple changes to the Illinois School Code and Illinois 
Educational Labor Relations Act, this article focuses on the changes which have 
received the most significant attention around the state, and have generated the 
greatest interest among union members: teacher layoffs (or reductions-in-force); 
impasse procedures and the right to strike; tenured teacher dismissal; and 
acquisition of tenure.[88] Unless otherwise noted, the discussion centers on 
changes applicable to school districts other than CPS. 
A.  Reduction-in-force 
Prior to SB 7, teacher layoffs, or reductions-in-force (RIFs),[89] due to a school 
district’s decision to decrease the number of teachers employed or discontinue a 
particular type of teaching program, were generally based upon what 
certifications  and legal qualifications a teacher possessed, whether the teacher was 
tenured or non-tenured, and how much seniority a teacher had in the school 
district.[90] It was a seniority-based layoff system established in state law.  Before 
laying off any tenured teacher because the district was reducing the number of 
positions, a school district would have to first layoff any non-tenured teachers who 
held a position for which the tenured teacher was certified and legally qualified to 
hold.  If a district got to the point where tenured teachers had to be laid off, the 
teacher with the least seniority in the district would be laid off first, the teacher 
with the next least seniority laid off second, etc. For example, if a district decided 
for financial reasons that it had to decrease the number of English positions by 
one, among the teachers currently filling those positions, anyone who was 
nontenured would be first to go.  If all were tenured, then the teacher with the least 
seniority would lose her position.  However, if she were qualified to teach another 
subject, for example Social Studies, she would be able to replace or “bump” any 
nontenured teacher or tenured teacher with less seniority who was teaching Social 
Studies.  A school district and union could agree in a collective bargaining 
agreement to an alternative method of determining the sequence of layoffs, but it 
had to use criteria as objectively-based as seniority.[91] 
Such seniority-based layoff systems have been under attack for years.  The 
argument is that “[s]eniority makes [school districts] ‘fire good teachers’ simply 
because they don’t have enough experience.”[92] And while seniority has for years 
“been considered a fair and impartial way of proceeding”[93] and some studies 
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have shown a correlation between seniority and teacher quality,[94] support of 
continued use of seniority-based systems has been weakening, even among union 
members, when there is an objectively-based alternative. 
One of PC’s major proposals was to eliminate the required use of seniority in 
RIFs.  Instead, teacher RIFs would be based on a teacher’s prior performance, 
using evaluation ratings as the predominant factor in determining performance, 
teacher certifications and qualifications.  In its discretion, a school district could 
consider other factors determined by the district to be in its best interests and 
seniority or tenured status, but only as a tie-breaker.  This proposed new procedure 
would not be a mandatory subject of bargaining, but instead would be developed 
“in consultation” with the district’s teachers. [95] 
In AFA, the unions countered with a proposal in which RIFs would be based on 
teacher certifications and legal qualifications, a teacher’s last two performance 
evaluations, one of which would have been completed under the new PERA 
evaluation law, and seniority, with evaluations being given significant but no more 
than equal weight to all other factors.  The weight given to performance evaluations 
would have to be agreed to by the district and union. Out of a concern that 
lessening the role of seniority while including performance evaluations as a 
significant factor could result in districts deciding to give more senior, more 
highly-compensated teachers lower evaluation ratings in order to RIF them and 
save money, AFA’s proposal prohibited the cost of a teacher’s salary and benefits 
from being a factor in deciding who to RIF.[96] 
The union’s proposal was a major step away from a seniority-based layoff system, 
and served as a basis from which discussions could progress.  several factors made 
it possible.  First, the internal discussions the unions had and continued to have 
among their members on this issue led to them to modify prior positions.  Second, 
both within Illinois and in other states, it was becoming clearer that elected 
officials’ support for a pure seniority-based layoff process was eroding.[97] Third, 
and most critical, was PERA and how it was being implemented:  the enhanced 
training and skills which all evaluators would need to have in order to perform 
teacher evaluations, beginning with the 2012-2013 school year; and the eventual 
move to a more objective evaluation system, developed jointly by teachers and 
administrators in each school district, based upon 1) how students’ performance 
improved in a teacher’s classroom measured by assessments other than state tests 
and 2) objective evidence as opposed to subjective assessment of how a teacher 
performs.[98] 
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The unions’ receptivity to significant consideration of performance in RIF 
decisions opened the door to full and far-reaching discussions on how best to 
structure such a system.  In addition to the concern that some districts might use 
evaluation as a tool to get rid of more-senior teachers because of their cost, the 
unions were also concerned, for example, that under the PC proposal, districts 
could decide to RIF teachers based solely on their most recent evaluation and not 
on a broader assessment of teachers’ performances.  Teachers who had excellent 
evaluations but changed assignments or had to use a new curriculum in their 
evaluation year could receive a lower evaluation and thus be more vulnerable to 
layoff.  The result “would be a huge disincentive for teachers to take on new 
challenges that might be good for their long-term development [and the 
development of their students] but in the short term lead to lower evaluation 
marks.”[99] Additionally, the PC proposal provided no statutory minimums 
regarding the criteria and procedures which districts could develop, without 
anything more than “consultation” with their teachers.  The unions strongly felt 
some state-level framework was required, with flexibility for local districts and 
their teachers to modify the state scheme to best meet their needs. The PC coalition 
and school management wanted a performance versus seniority-based layoff 
process in effect as soon as possible, so that more good teachers would not be 
RIFed just because they lacked the seniority.  When it came to assessing whether 
a teacher was qualified for a particular position in a school district, they also argued 
that districts should be allowed to require qualifications above and beyond the 
minimums established by the State.[100] 
Those involved in the negotiations truly listened to one another.  The result is a 
statutory framework which places teachers into four performance groups based 
primarily on their last two evaluations and sorts teachers within the highest three 
groups based on their seniority.[101] It empowers local school districts and their 
teachers, through a joint committee composed of equal representation,[102] to 
modify the criteria for placing teachers in three of the four performance groups 
based upon local considerations.  These components address the unions’ concerns 
over having a teacher’s fate determined by one evaluation with at best 
discretionary consideration of seniority and the lack of local flexibility to make 
modifications, particularly for teachers who take on new responsibilities.[103] In 
addition, if members of the joint committee have a good faith belief that a 
disproportionate number of senior teachers have received recent evaluations lower 
than their prior ones, they can request and receive from the district relevant data 
to review and then issue a report to the school board and union. [104] While not 
the outright prohibition on salary and benefit cost as a factor in layoffs, the unions 
accepted the joint committee review and report, combined with the increased 
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objectivity of evaluations and laws regarding age and union discrimination, as 
sufficient protection. The unions have committed to their members to carefully 
review and, if called for, to take appropriate legal action where their leaders or 
more senior members receive lower evaluations and are laid off.  Bumping rights 
were maintained, so that a teacher who is laid off from one position but is qualified 
for another can bump a teacher in a lower performance group or in the same 
performance group with less seniority.[105] School districts got the flexibility to 
require additional qualifications beyond state minima for teaching positions, but 
such qualifications have to be in a job description for the relevant position by May 
10 prior to the year in which layoffs are determined.[106] Finally, existing 
collective bargaining agreements with language on determining which teachers are 
laid off and recalled were grandfathered until June 30, 2013 or contract 
termination date, whichever is earlier.[107] 
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The following charts depict how teachers are grouped and then sorted for RIFs:
 
 
How this new framework is implemented will be critical.  One implementation 
issue is the development of the RIF list.  In mid-size to large school districts, 
establishing the list will be more difficult.  To aid districts in this responsibility, the 
Illinois Association of School Administrators has developed an excellent program 
which reflects the nuances of the law.[108] As with the seniority lists which were 
part of the former RIF process, RIF lists are to be developed in consultation with 
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the local teachers’ union, if one exists.  Unlike those seniority lists, the RIF lists 
may not be publicly posted so that individual teachers can be identified, because 
they reflect each teacher’s last two or three evaluations.  The lists can, however, be 
provided to the teachers’ union.[109] As teachers have the legal responsibility to 
review their placement on the RIF list,[110] school districts should also provide 
each teacher with his/her RIF grouping information, including the evaluation and 
seniority information used to place the teacher.  In addition, because seniority 
continues to have a role not only in RIFs, but often other employment decisions 
and benefits, districts should continue to maintain seniority lists. 
Other implementation issues will undoubtedly occur.  The statewide school 
management groups, particularly IASA, and IEA and IFT, have vowed to work 
together as much as possible to assure successful implementation not only in the 
area of RIFs, but other SB 7 areas.  ISBE has developed an extensive guidance 
document to assist school districts, teachers and unions in implementing SB 7.[111] 
B.  Impasse Procedures and the Right to Strike 
As mentioned earlier in this article, neither the unions, in AFA, nor the School 
Management Alliance proposed any changes to the IELRA. However, PC proposed 
several major changes to the IELRA for K-12 school districts: converting many 
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining in Chicago to prohibited subjects 
of bargaining; requiring a union, prior to being able to strike, to go through an 
elongated fact-finding process  and banning strikes unless the school board took 
the highly unlikely step of not choosing to accept its own final offer presented to 
the fact-finder, the fact-finder’s recommendation or the union’s final offer; and 
penalizing a union for engaging in an illegal strike, by stripping it of its IELRB 
certification as the exclusive bargaining representative and taking away its ability 
to collect union dues through payroll deduction.[112] Claiming that their proposals 
would “put student well-being at the center of contract negotiations” and assure 
the public that “every effort has been made to reach a settlement before the 
negotiation process is allowed to disrupt communities,” PC further asserted that 
the proposal “does not prohibit strikes, but proposes fact-finding as a preventative 
measure.”[113] Quite to the contrary, the PC proposals would have “effectively 
eliminate[d] the legal strike,”[114] sending labor relations in Illinois back to pre-
IELRA days, when strikes, although illegal, occurred in significantly greater 
numbers than they have since the IELRA was passed, particularly over the last 10 
years.[115] Needless to say, the unions strongly opposed the PC proposals 
regarding the IELRA. 
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In conducting the SB 7 negotiations, Senator Lightford prioritized and had the 
parties discuss those issues on which more than one party had offered a 
proposal.  She keenly saw that these were areas in which compromise could most 
likely be achieved.  Therefore, changes to the IELRA were left to the very 
end.[116] While the unions continued to oppose any changes, it became clear that 
some were going to happen.[117] In supporting its extreme mandatory fact-finding 
proposal, PC had stressed how it would bring “transparency” to the bargaining 
process, because the findings of the fact-finding panel would be published in 
newspapers, thus allowing the public to debate the issues.  This would ensure that 
the parties presented reasonable offers.[118] The unions did not  disagree that 
some public airing of each party’s positions on unresolved issues after a period of 
good faith bargaining might be helpful to the negotiations process.  They and 
others[119] believed, however, that mandatory fact-finding, particularly the one 
proposed by PC, would significantly hurt the bargaining process.[120] 
As a result, SB 7 does not include mandatory fact-finding for school 
districts[121] outside of Chicago.[122] Instead, it requires such districts and their 
unions, at a point after mediation has begun but negotiations have bogged down, 
to publicly post their existing positions on unresolved issues.[123] It was added for 
three primary purposes: 1) to make the collective bargaining process in k-12 school 
districts more transparent to the public; 2) to equally pressure both employers and 
unions to be more realistic in their bargaining positions; and 3) to provide the 
parties, once their last offers were posted, the opportunity to continue negotiating 
if at all possible, with the added dynamic of the public now knowing what each 
party’s last positions were on unresolved issues.   The intent was simple: establish 
a process in k-12 negotiations which would enhance the likelihood of an agreement 
and decrease the likelihood of a strike, without tipping the bargaining scale toward 
one party or  the other.  The drafters’ goal was to minimize disruption of the k-12 
educational process.  Their belief was that doing so, along with the other changes 
made by SB 7, would be a positive step toward enhancing k-12 student learning 
and achievement. 
This subsection applies by its very language and was intended by the drafters to 
apply only to public school districts other than CPS, or a combination of public 
schools districts: 
(a-5)  This subsection (a-5) applies only to collective bargaining between a public school 
district or a combination of public school districts, including but not limited to, joint 
cooperatives, that is not organized under Article 34 of the School Code and an exclusive 
representative of its employees. 
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It does not apply nor was it intended by the drafters to apply to community colleges 
or four-year higher education institutions.  That is why the above language was 
chosen instead of making the subsection applicable to bargaining between an 
exclusive bargaining representative and an educational employer, which is in 
relevant part defined in Section 2(a) of the IELRA as: “…the governing body of a 
public school district,…combination of public school districts,…public community 
college district or State college or university….”[124] If the broader term 
“educational employer” had been used in subsection (a-5), it would have applied 
to all entities which fall within the meaning of that term. However, that is not what 
the drafters intended, and it is not what the General Assembly enacted in SB 7. 
The process required in subsection (a-5) is modeled in significant part after a 
similar public posting statute in Oregon.[125] Both statutes provide that any time 
15 days after the commencement of mediation, either party may initiate the public 
posting process by declaring impasse.  Notification of such impasse must be 
immediately provided to the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB), 
with copies to the other party and the mediator.  Within seven days of this 
declaration, each party must submit to the mediator, the IELRB and each other 
their final offers on each unresolved issue, including cost summaries for those 
which are financial.  If, seven days after the IELRB has received these offers, the 
parties have not notified the IELRB that they have reached agreement, the IELRB 
will post the offers on its website.  A union may not strike until the offers have been 
posted for 14 days.[126]While subsection (a-5) does not specify and the drafters 
did not specifically discuss how the parties must submit their offers, the subsection 
does set specific timelines, i.e., the offers must be provided within seven days of 
the declaration of impasse and the IELRB must publicly post the offers seven days 
after receiving them, if agreement is not reached. 
The purposes behind this process, as well as the Oregon statute upon which it is in 
part modeled, are to increase the transparency of negotiations, equally pressure 
both parties to be more realistic in their bargaining positions and provide the 
parties with an opportunity to negotiate knowing that their positions will shortly 
be or already have been made known to the public.  Subsection (a-5) demonstrates 
this intent to encourage the parties to continue negotiating during this period: 
“[T]he Board shall make public the final offers… [on] those issues on which the 
parties have failed to reach agreement…, unless otherwise notified…that 
agreement has been reached.”[127] Thus, the use of the terms “impasse” and “final 
offer” are not meant as a statutory determination that, upon initiation of the public 
posting process, an employer may unilaterally implement its final offers.[128] Nor 
are they meant to be a statutory determination that the “totality of circumstances” 
standard set forth by the IELRB in Kewanee Community Unit School District 
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229,[129] is no longer valid.[130] If they were interpreted in such a way, it would 
negate the purposes for which the public posting subsection was inserted in the 
first place.[131] 
Other than minor changes to the timelines for filing certain negotiation notices 
with the IELRB,[132] SB 7 made no other changes to the IELRA as it applies to 
school districts, other than CPS, and unions, other than CTU.  None of the strike 
penalty provisions proposed by PC were included.  For CPS and 
CTU[133] specifically, however, SB 7 made several significant additional 
changes.[134] As mentioned earlier, CPS and CTU are now required to go through 
mandatory fact-finding instead of the public posting process applicable to other 
school districts and their unions.[135] Although the mandatory fact-finding 
process applicable to CPS is somewhat less onerous than the one proposed by PC, 
particularly in that it does not empower CPS to unilaterally end the fact-finding 
process and the union’s right to strike by accepting the fact-finder’s 
recommendation or even its own,[136] it effectively delays a CPS-union’s ability to 
strike for four months from the date the fact-finding panel is 
appointed.[137] Additionally, SB 7 provides that for any CPS-unionized employees 
to strike, at least three-fourths of all bargaining unit employees who are members 
of the union must vote in favor of striking.[138] While some have questioned how 
the unions could have accepted these changes,[139] the reality was that the 
greatest concern of PC and others in support of it was a CTU strike, which they 
wanted to either eliminate or lessen the likelihood of occurring.  The unions, and 
in particular CTU, believed that the changes made were the better alternative for 
CPS unions and their members.[140] 
As discussed earlier, the length of the CPS school day and school year drove 
another SB 7 change.  Decisions on the length of that day and year are now 
specifically listed as permissive subjects of bargaining under Section 4.5 (a) of the 
IELRA.[141] Once the current CTU-CPS collective bargaining agreement expires 
this year,[142] CPS will not have to bargain a decision to increase the school day or 
year.  However, the impact of that decision remains a mandatory subject of 
bargaining.  All the other PC proposals to convert many mandatory and permissive 
subjects of bargaining in Chicago to prohibited subjects of bargaining were 
dropped. 
Changes were also made to Section 4.5(b) of the IELRA.  That subsection provides 
that while CPS and the Chicago City Colleges are required to bargain the impact of 
decisions involving the permissive subjects of bargaining listed in Section 4.5(a) of 
the IELRA, disputes or impasses over that specific bargaining are to be resolved 
exclusively through a special dispute resolution process provided for in Section 
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12(b) of the IELRA in lieu of the right of the union to strike.[143] SB 7 added 
language clarifying that neither the IELRB nor a mediator or fact-finder appointed 
under the new fact-finding procedure established for CPS shall have jurisdiction 
over the specific disputes and impasses covered by Section 4.5(b).[144] 
C.  Tenured Teacher Dismissal 
All parties to the SB 7 negotiations believed that changes were needed in the 
process for dismissing tenured teachers for poor performance.  All felt that the 
process took too long and cost too much.[145] Where they differed was how to 
reduce both time and cost.  PC and the School Management Alliance also believed 
that the process delegated too much authority to someone other than the school 
district – an independent hearing officer — to determine whether the teacher 
would be dismissed.[146] The unions believed that having an independent 
decision maker was a fair and objective check on a school district’s decision. 
The then-existing process provided that if teachers who were unsatisfactorily 
evaluated and failed to successfully complete a 90-school day remediation period 
would be dismissed.  The teacher could appeal[147] that dismissal to an 
independent hearing officer usually mutually-chosen by the parties from a list 
provided by ISBE,[148] who would hold a hearing and decide whether the teacher 
should be dismissed or retained by the school district.  No time limits were 
practically placed on when the hearing would start,[149] how long it would take 
and when it would end.  This tended to result in drawn out and costly proceedings 
when a hearing actually occurred.[150] Whoever was dissatisfied with the hearing 
officer’s decision could then appeal it through the state court system. Overall, the 
system needed improvement. 
PC’s approach to improvement was to create a system which was immensely tilted 
toward school districts.[151] Under its proposal, the teacher could appeal her 
dismissal to a school district panel composed of two district representatives and 
one union representative, the teacher and school district would each have two days 
to present their case at the hearing and the burden would be on the teacher to show 
that the evaluation on which the dismissal was based was not valid or 
appropriate.  This panel would then recommend to the school board whether to 
dismiss the teacher, retain the teacher or demote the teacher to non-tenured status 
but still retain her.[152]The independent hearing officer was nowhere to be 
seen.  The unions’ approach, as set out in AFA, applied to both dismissals for 
unsatisfactory performance and misconduct.  It 1) kept the independent hearing 
officer who would decide whether the teacher would be dismissed and not just 
make a recommendation to the school district, 2) required the hearing to start 75 
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days and finish 120 days after the hearing officer was appointed, 3) mandated both 
parties to share all relevant evidence with each other no less than 15 days prior to 
the beginning of the hearing, 4) maintained the burden of proof on the district and 
5) limited  each party to four days to present a case at the hearing.  The unions’ 
goal was to streamline the process, while maintaining fairness and objectivity. 
What resulted was turning one dismissal process into three: one for dismissals 
based upon misconduct (also called dismissals for cause), one for dismissals based 
upon unsatisfactory performance evaluations and one for dismissals based upon 
unsatisfactory performance evaluations completed after a school district 
implements the PERA evaluation system.[153] The latter process is an option 
which school districts may choose but are not required to use in place of the other 
performance evaluation process.[154] All three processes are similarly 
streamlined, requiring the hearing to begin within 75 days and finish within 120 
days of the independent hearing officer’s appointment, mandating the sharing of 
all relevant evidence, keeping the burden of proof on the school district and a 
limitation on the number of days each party has to present a case (no more than 
three days each for misconduct and regular performance evaluation 
dismissals,[155] no more than two days each for PERA-evaluation 
dismissals[156]).  Beginning with dismissals occurring on and after July 1, 2012, 
the cost of the hearing officer will be equally split between the parties, unless the 
teacher opts to have the school district pay the whole cost.[157] If the teacher 
chooses to have the school district pay the whole cost, then the district alone selects 
the hearing officer from the list maintained by ISBE,[158] instead of the teacher 
and district mutually-selecting someone. All hearing officers, beginning 
September 1, 2012, must have successfully completed training provided or 
approved by ISBE, so that they are “familiar with issues generally involved in 
[performance evaluation and misconduct dismissals].”[159] 
There are some differences between the three processes.  First, for dismissals 
based on unsatisfactory performance, the independent hearing officer makes the 
final decision, which can then be appealed through the state court system (starting 
with the circuit court) using a manifest weight of the evidence standard.  For both 
misconduct and PERA-evaluation dismissals, the independent hearing officer 
makes findings of fact and a recommendation to the school district.  The district 
then has 45 days to make the final decision.[160] 
In misconduct dismissals, the school district is bound by the hearing officer’s 
findings of fact unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.  If the 
school district dismisses a teacher when the hearing officer recommended the 
teacher be retained, the district must issue a written decision with reasons.[161] If 
SPRING 2012 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS  25 
 
 
the teacher appeals the decision (starting with the circuit court), the district’s 
written decision and the hearing officer’s recommendation are both considered by 
the court under a manifest weight of the evidence standard.  This safeguard was 
critical to the unions agreeing to the hearing officer making a dismissal 
recommendation as opposed to the actual decision.[162] If the hearing officer 
recommends dismissal and the school district dismisses the teacher, then only the 
district’s decision is reviewed on appeal. 
In PERA-evaluation dismissals, as with regular performance evaluation 
dismissals, a tenured teacher will go through a 90-day remediation period 
following an unsatisfactory evaluation.  During that remediation period, the 
teacher will be evaluated at 45 days and 90 days.  If at the end of the remediation 
period the teacher does not receive a proficient or better evaluation, she will be 
dismissed.[163] During the remediation period, if a school district chooses to use 
the PERA-evaluation dismissal process, the district must select an individual, 
other than the one who gave the teacher the initial unsatisfactory evaluation, to 
either perform the official 45 day and 90 day evaluations or conduct an 
“independent assessment” of the teacher’s performance during that 
period.[164] This individual is called the “second evaluator,” and cannot be the 
evaluator who gave the teacher the unsatisfactory evaluation or someone who 
reports to that person.[165] The school district selects the second evaluator 
through a process developed in good faith cooperation with the local union, from 
a list which includes both district and union appointees.[166] If the second 
evaluator performs the official remediation evaluations, the school district is 
bound by those evaluations. If the second evaluator finds the teacher successfully 
remediated her performance,[167] the district must retain her. If the second 
evaluator finds the teacher has not successfully remediated, the district must 
dismiss her.  If the second evaluator conducts an independent assessment of the 
teacher’s performance and finds the teacher successfully remediated, but the 
school district still dismisses the teacher, the district must demonstrate to the 
hearing officer why its assessment of the teacher’s performance is more valid than 
the second evaluator’s assessment.  In addition to the use of the second evaluator, 
only school board members trained in the PERA evaluation law[168] may vote on 
whether to dismiss the teacher.  Furthermore, under the PERA-evaluation 
dismissal process, the hearing is shorter (two days v. three days for each party to 
present a case), the scope of the hearing is more restricted than in a regular 
evaluation dismissal[169] and, if a teacher appeals the district’s dismissal decision, 
the appeal goes directly to the appellate court, as opposed to the circuit court, and 
the standard of review is limited if the hearing officer recommended 
dismissal.[170] 
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Overall, SB 7 streamlines the tenured teacher dismissal process, builds in greater 
protections for teachers in those situations where the hearing officer no longer 
makes the dismissal decision but instead makes a recommendation to the school 
district, and adds a level of independent assessment of a remediating teacher that 
never before existed.  All of these factors, along with the enhancement to the 
quality of evaluators and the objectivity of the evaluation process made by the 
PERA law, provided all three unions with a sufficient basis to agree to these 
changes. 
D. Tenure Acquisition 
It might surprise some that public school teachers in Illinois do not earn 
“tenure.”  What they earn is “contractual continued service”[171] which, 
nonetheless, is commonly called tenure.[172] Since 1998, a teacher has had to 
complete four consecutive school terms (school term is essentially the same as 
school year and the terms will be used interchangeably in this article) of full-time 
service (commonly called the “probationary period”) and be re-employed for a fifth 
school term to acquire tenure.[173] At the end of any of the first three years, all a 
district had to do to dismiss the teacher for the following school year was provide 
a written notice of nonrenewal at least 45 days before the end of the school term. 
No specific reasons or cause had to be provided. If such nonrenewal occurred at 
the end of the fourth year, the district had to provide a specific written reason or 
reasons for the nonrenewal.[174] However, as long as a school district provided a 
specific written reason which fairly apprised the teacher of the basis for 
nonrenewal and which was not discriminatory, arbitrary or in violation of the state 
or federal constitution, its decision was almost invariably safe from challenge.[175] 
While one would assume that a school district would not from year to year make a 
decision to renew or not renew a teacher without basing it on an assessment of how 
the teacher was performing, nothing in the law clearly required that.  And, as what 
was anecdotally shared during the SB 7 negotiations, some school districts did not 
annually evaluate their non-tenured or probationary teachers, let alone base their 
renewal/nonrenewal decisions on evaluations.  All parties to the SB 7 negotiations 
were united in making changes to how tenure is acquired.  They wanted 
evaluations to play a significant role.[176] However, their approaches somewhat 
varied. 
Because of the increased objectivity, fairness and quality that the PERA law will 
bring to performance evaluations, PC and AFA proposed that a clear tie between 
performance and acquiring tenure not begin in a school district until it first 
implemented PERA.[177] Their major differences came over the length of the 
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probationary period in which a teacher would need to attain positive (proficient or 
excellent) evaluations to acquire tenure, the number of such evaluations required, 
whether acquisition of tenure could be accelerated (less than four years) based on 
consecutive positive evaluations, and whether tenure attained in one school 
district could be used to shorten the time needed to acquire tenure in a new district 
if a teacher moved (tenure portability), a concept that the unions had been 
unsuccessfully working on legislatively for many years.[178] 
PC and the School Management Alliance proposed an unlimited probationary 
period in which a teacher could accrue four consecutive school terms of positive 
evaluations.[179] The unions were notably troubled by this proposal, as school 
districts could keep teachers in a perpetual probationary period by continuing to 
give a needs improvement[180] evaluation to a teacher or just breaking a string of 
positive evaluations with a negative one.  AFA proposed retaining the four 
consecutive school term probationary period in which a teacher would acquire 
tenure if she received three positive evaluations during that time.  As the 
discussions evolved, the parties focused on their shared recognition that they 
wanted to provide new teachers with the time needed to improve their skills 
without penalizing them for taking a year or two to become proficient.  As a result, 
SB 7 maintains a four year probationary period, but requires that the teacher 
receive a proficient or better evaluation in the second or third year, and a proficient 
or better evaluation in the fourth year, to be eligible to receive tenure.[181] This 
provides a teacher with a fair opportunity to improve skills, clearly ties 
performance to acquiring tenure and does not permit a school district to continue 
a teacher in an ongoing probationary period.  If a teacher does not meet the 
requirements for tenure at the end of the four-year probationary period, the school 
district must fire her.[182] 
When it came to accelerated tenure, PC proposed providing it to teachers who 
received three consecutive excellent evaluations, AFA proposed providing it for 
three consecutive proficient or excellent evaluations and the School Management 
Alliance did not propose it at all, although it was open to the concept.[183] SB 7 
provides for accelerated tenure, after PERA is implemented, for three consecutive 
excellent evaluations then reemployment for the next school term.[184] 
As for tenure portability, AFA proposed that a tenured teacher who left one district 
and was employed by another would be able to acquire tenure in the second district 
after receiving proficient or better evaluations in the first two years, while PC and 
the School Management Alliance did not propose it at all.[185] SB 7 provides for 
tenure portability, after PERA has been implemented, for two consecutive 
excellent evaluations in the teacher’s first two years in the new school district.  The 
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teacher’s prior two evaluations in the former district must be proficient or better 
PERA-evaluations, and she must have voluntarily left or been laid off from that 
district.[186] On both of these issues, while not what the unions had proposed, SB 
7 establishes concepts for which they had worked many years. 
Two other issues proposed by the unions ended up going nowhere.  First, they 
proposed that if a teacher received an excellent evaluation, a school district had to 
renew (re-employ) her for the subsequent school term. Their rationale was: What 
non-arbitrary, performance-based reason could lead a district to nonrenew a 
teacher who had received an excellent evaluation?  If performance truly counts, 
how could that decision be in the best interests of the students?  Second, the unions 
proposed that if a teacher received a proficient evaluation, a school district would 
have to provide specific written reasons for nonrenewing her for the next school 
term, no matter where she was in her probationary period.[187] Their rationale 
was again: If performance truly counts, why shouldn’t a teacher who the district 
has evaluated as proficient be at least provided the reasons why she was not being 
re-employed?  The objection to both of these proposals was that they infringed on 
a school district’s authority to decide, for whatever reason other than one which 
was discriminatory or in violation of the state or federal constitution, whether to 
continue employing a teacher prior to acquiring tenure, at which point the district 
would need cause to terminate.  Unfortunately, because of the longstanding 
legislative and judicial acceptance of this principle and the number and 
prioritization of other matters, SB 7 made no changes on these two issues. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As I hope this article shows, quality public policy does not occur overnight.  It is a 
process which takes leadership, time, dedication, knowledge, experience, openness 
to ideas and an ability to find common ground.  Coming out of such a process, SB 
7 and other recent education reform legislation have provided public education in 
the state with powerful tools.  While they are not perfect,[188] if used with fidelity 
to the high quality work and relationships, intent and purpose from which they 
were forged, these tools will break meaningful ground.  It will not be easy, 
particularly in light of the serious financial stress on the state, school districts, 
employees and families. But we must do it together: unions, management, elected 
officials, parents, students and communities.  And we must bring our best to the 
effort.  Anything less is a disservice to the children of the state and those who strive 
to help them succeed. 
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Legislation, 1 (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.iasaedu.org/mages/stories/Per 
formance%20Counts%20Act%20of%202010_final(1).pdf. 
[63] For a succinct explanation of fact-finding, see Elkouri & Elkouri, How 
Arbitration Works 1366 (6th .ed, Allen Miles Ruben, ed.2003). 
[64] A few weeks after PC was released, the Illinois School Management Alliance, 
which is composed of the Illinois Association of School Board (IASB), the Illinois 
Association of School Administrators (IASA), the Illinois Principals Association 
(IPA) and the Illinois Association of School Business Officials (IASBO), release its 
own draft legislation, which closely resembled the PC legislation in many areas, 
but did not include any proposals for changes to the IELRA. A copy of school 
management’s proposal is available at http://www.iasbo.org/files/public/Per 
formance_Counts_Act_of_2010_-_Mgmt_Alliance_ Draft_Final% 5B1%5 D.pdf. 
[65] See Edelman, supra note 54. 
[66] Both Dan Montgomery and Karen Lewis had just recently become presidents 
of their respective unions, Montgomery becoming IFT President in October 2010 
and Lewis becoming CTU President in July 2010. 
[67] Andrew Thomason, Teachers Unions on Reform: Slow Down, Illinois 
Statehouse News, Dec. 16, 2010, available at http://illinois.statehousenews 
online.com/4720/teachers-unions-on-reform-slow-down/. 
[68] See Press Release, Ill. Fed’n of Teachers, Ill. Educ. Ass’n and Chi. Teachers 
Union, Accountability for All: A New Way Forward for Illinois Students (Jan 3. 
2012) (http://www.ift-aft.org/Libraries/Documents/IEAIFTCTUSUMMARY-FIN 
AL_1.sflb.ashx); see also Press Release, Ill. Fed’n of Teachers, Ill. Educ. Ass’n and 
Chi. Teachers Union, Educators Will Proposed ‘Accountability for All’ Education 
Reform Legislation (Jan. 3, 2012) (http://www.ift-aft.org/news/pressreleases/11-





[69] Both AFA and PC also proposed that, beginning with the 2012-2013 school 
year, every school annually administer to staff, students and parents, a survey on 
the instructional environment within the school. For a comparison of PC, AFA and 
the Illinois School Management Proposal, see Ill. Ass’n of School Bus. 
Officials, Analysis and Comparison of Education Reform Proposals, 1 (Jan. 21, 
2011), http://www.iasbo.org/files/public/1_Analysis%20and%20Comparison%2
0ofEducation%20Reform%20Proposals%20-1.20.11.pdf. 
[70] Not all the unions’ members were 100% enthused. See e.g. Jim 
Vail, Questions About Deals to head off ‘Performance Counts’…’Accountability for 
All’ Raises Eyebrows Among CTU Rank-and-File, Substance News, Jan. 22, 
2011, available athttp://www.substancenews.net/articles.php?page=1946; IEA, 
IFT and CTU Offer an Alternative to Reform Bill, Fred Klonsky (Jan 3, 
2011), http://preaprez.wordpress.com/2011/01/03/iea-ift-and-ctu-offer-an-alte 
rnative-reform-bill/. 
[71] See Nat’l Educ. Ass’n Priority Schools Campaign, Accountability Plan Unites 
Educators in Illinois, Feb. 6, 2011,  http://neapriorityschools.org/professional-ed 
ucators/accountability-plan-unites-educators-in-illinois; Regenstein,  supra note 
8, at 11. 
[72] See Regenstein, supra note 8, at 12. 
[73] At the first meeting on Jan. 27, 2011, over 60 people attended.  Sen. Lightford 
realized that meaningful discussions could not occur in such a large group.  She set 
a limit on how many representatives each group could have at subsequent 
meetings. Groups regularly represented at the meetings included: ISBE; AFA 
Coalition of the 3 unions (IEA, IFT and CTU); PC coalition of Stand for Children, 
Advance Illinois, Illinois Business Roundtable, Civic Committee of the Commercial 
Club of Chicago and Illinois Chamber of Commerce; school management (IASB, 
IASA, IPA, IASBO, CPAA (Chicago Principals and Administrators Association); 
LUDA (Large Urban District Association – advocacy group for the largest 53 unit 
school districts in Illinois); EDRED (Education Research Development – advocacy 
group for suburban Chicago School districts); SCOPE (South Cooperative 
Organization for Public Education — grassroots local organization focusing on the 
needs of school districts in south and southwest suburban Cook and Will 
Counties); Chicago Public Schools; Parent PAC (advocacy group for public school 
parents).  In addition, the other Senators on the committee and several House 
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members, i.e., Reps. Eddy and Representative Chapa La Via, representatives from 
the Governor’s Office, including Deputy Chief of Staff Julie Smith, attended some 
if not most of the meetings. See id. 
[74] Issues which were specific to education and labor relations in the Chicago 
Public Schools were most often worked on by representatives from CPS, including 
Rachel Resnick, CPS Chief Labor Relations Officer, Joe Moriarty, CPS Deputy 
General Counsel, and CPS outside counsel Stephanie Donovan and Jim Franczek 
of Franczek & Radelet; representatives from CTU, including Karen Lewis, CTU 
President, and CTU outside counsel Robert Bloch of Dowd, Bloch & Bennett and 
Mike Persoon of Despres, Schwartz & Geoghegan, and from time to time 
representatives from the CPAA, including Executive Director Clarice Berry. See 
id. at 13. 
[75] The school report card is a document that is produced for each regular public 
school in compliance with Section 10-17a of the Illinois School Code, 105 ILCS 
5/10-17a. It includes information such as how students in every Illinois school 
district and each district school have performed on state assessments, student 
demographics, staffing, teacher demographics, etc. Thanks to legislation 
sponsored by both Sen. Lightford and Rep. Chapa La Via, beginning with the 2013-
2014 school year, new school report cards will be used.  More information on the 
new report cards is available at Ill. Gov’t News Network, Governor Quinn Signs 
Law to Overhaul School Performance Reporting, http://www.illinois.gov/Press 
Releases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=9985. 
[76] “See Sen. Kimberly Lightford, Comments on Education Reform and Collective 
Bargaining, Ill. Statehouse News, Apr. 6, 2011, available at http://www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=PCl3COtZu98&feature=plcp&context=C4987cabVDvjVQa1PpcF 
PTsbp3lTQ4yIIwiFFAK1vIi6m3OsOO5go%3D (“For me, (it’s about) what’s best 
for the student and the classroom.  If we’re all focused on getting the best results 
for the students, I’m pretty sure we can come up as education stakeholders and 
adults and professionals in the room with the process in which to get there”). 
[77] See Ill. Senate Democrats, Sen. Lightford’s Biography, http://www.senate 
dem.ilga.gov/index. php/about-me-lightford. 
[78] See Regenstein, supra note 8, at 15. (Sen. Lightford also kept a close watch on 
how each group communicated with its members.  When a group was caught 
encouraging its members to advance its own positions by lobbying legislators 
outside of the process or mischaracterizing ongoing discussions, she quickly and 
effectively addressed the matter in no uncertain terms.). 
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[79] See Stephanie Banchero, Illinois Attempts to Link Teacher Tenure to Results, 
The Wall St. Journal, Jan. 4, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 
1000142405274870411150457 6060122295287678.html; Doug Finke, Illinois 
House Committee to Take on Education Reform Proposals, The State Journal-
Register, Dec. 11, 2010, available at http://www.sj-r.com/top-stories/x1757 
257545/Illinois-House-committee-to-take-on-education-reform-proposals. 
[80] From IEA’s perspective, the advocacy, work ethic and professionalism of in 
particular ISBE General Counsel Reisberg, IASA General Counsel Boucek and 
former ISBE General Counsel Furr, who was representing PC, were of the highest 
order. This does not mean that relationships between others were not at times 
strained.  While IEA had developed a good relationship with Advance Illinois over 
the years, when Advance Illinois partnered with SFC, a group with which IEA had 
no relationship and who had not shown in other states a desire to work with 
teachers’ unions, the IEA-Advance Illinois relationship was hurt.  The two groups, 
for the most part, worked through the problem.  See Regenstein, supra note 8, at 
14. 
[81] Cheryl Burton, Illinois Senate Passes Education Reform Bill, ABC News (Apr. 
14, 2011), http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local/illinois&id=807 
3470; see Montgomery, supra note 13; Ill. Ass’n of School Adm’rs, IASA Supports 
Landmark Education Reform Package 1 (April 15, 2011), http://dime 
141.dizinc.com/~iasa/images/stories/Press%20Release%20042511%20Educatio
n%20Reform.pdf; Stand for Children, Major Changes to Illinois Schools on 
Horizon with Senate Bill 7, http://performancecounts.org/our-update/major-
changes-illinois-schools-horizon-introduction-senate-bill-7 )  (The legislation was 
actually passed twice, once as Senate Bill 7 and once as Senate Bill 630, because of 
a concern that SB 7 was not procedurally ready to be voted on by the full Senate. 
All the parties who participated in the months-long negotiations publicly 
supported the legislation.) 
[82] The House had initially shown the greatest interest in PC as it was originally 
drafted. Furthermore, during early 2011, while the Senate Committee was doing its 
work, there were continued rumblings from the House that they were getting 
impatient and would move PC or some legislation significantly based upon it if the 
Senate didn’t get something done. Chris Wetterich, House Committee Approves 
Education Reform Bill: Changes Needed, The State Journal-Registrar, May 11, 
2011 available at http://www.sj-r.com/top-stories/x1058160665/House-comm it 
tee-approves-education-reform-bill. 
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[83] The final Senate committee meeting occurred in the late afternoon and 
evening of Tuesday, April 12, 2011, at which changes to the IELRA were 
resolved.  After several hours of negotiations, it was left to the core group of 
attorneys and a few others to finalize language.  The most complex issues involved 
the relationship between CPS and CTU; in particular, Section 4.5 and 12(b) of the 
IELRA, and the CTU’s right to strike. Unfortunately, CPS representatives, who had 
been involved in the drafting of the language from which the core group worked, 
could not stay to draft the final language.  The core group was therefore unaware 
that language dealing with the jurisdiction of the IELRB and other third-parties 
addressed an issue which was in litigation at the time.  See Chicago Teachers 
Union and Chicago Board of Education, No. 2011-CA-0033-C (IELRB 2011). In 
addition, a dispute developed about the language dealing with the membership 
vote which CTU would need in order to strike.  These issues led the CTU Executive 
Board and House of Delegates, in early May 2011, to reverse its position of support 
for the legislation. See Press Release, Chi. Teacher’s Union, Chicago Teachers 
Union Governing Body Supports Changes to SB7 (May 5, 2011) (http://www.ct 
unet.com/blog/press-release-chicago-teachers-union-governing-body-supports-c 
hanges-to-sb7). 
[84] See Ill. Gen. Assembly, Bill Status of SB0007, http://www.ilga.gov/ 
legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=7&GAID=11&DocTypeID=SB&LegId=53964 
&SessionID=84&GA=97 It passed the Senate 54-0 and the House 112-1-1. 
[85] See Ill. Gen. Assembly, Bill Status of HB1197, http://www.ilga.gov/ 
legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=1197&GAID=11&DocTypeID=HB&LegId=5 
7145&SessionID=84&GA=97. HB 1197 is what is commonly referred to as a “trailer 
bill,” which typically makes clarifications or corrections to another bill recently 
passed by the General Assembly.  It passed the Senate 51-5 and the House 116-0. 
[86] The time between the passage of SB 7 and HB 1197 was tense for the 
unions.  At the time SB 7 was passed on May 12, it was still unclear whether CPS 
and CTU would be able to reach a resolution on their issues and then whether a 
trailer bill would be passed. This uncertainty led all three unions to change their 
positions of support for SB 7 to either neutral (IEA) or opposition (IFT and 
CTU). See Kristen McQueary, Education Bill Moves On Despite Objections, Chi. 
News Cooperative, May 11, 2011, available at:http://www.chicagonewscoop.org/ 
education-bill-moves-on-despite-objections/.  The unions were prepared to ask 
the Governor to step in.  However, due to the skills of and relationship between 
Jim Franczek, CPS outside attorney, and Robert Bloch, CTU outside attorney, and 
the support of newly-elected Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel and CTU President 
Karen Lewis, a resolution was reached.  See Regenstein, supra note 8, at 18. For a 
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fuller discussion of the CPS-CTU negotiations, see James Franczek & Amy 
Dickerson, Education Reform in Illinois: Making Performance Count, 29 Illinois 
Public Employee Relations Report, Winter 2012, at  1. 
[87] HB 1197 became P.A. 97-007, available at: http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ 
publicacts/97/PDF/097-0007.pdf; and SB 7 became P.A. 97-008, available 
at: http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/97/PDF/097-0008.pdf. 
[88] For a synopsis of all those changes made by SB 7, see Appendix A. For an 
excellent guidance document produced by ISBE on many SB 7 and PERA issues, 
see note 41, supra. 
[89] Also called “honorable dismissals” to distinguish them from dismissals for 
cause due to misconduct or unsatisfactory performance, and decisions not to 
renew the employment of non-tenured teachers. 
[90] Illinois School Code § 24-12, 105 ILCS 5/24-12. A different procedure applied 
in CPS. See Illinois School Code § 34-18.31, 105 ILCS 5/34-18.31. 
[91] See Schafer v. Bd. of Educ. of Arlington Heights School Dist. No. 25, 157 
Ill.App.3d 884, 510 N.E.2d 1186 (1st Dist. 1987) (alternative method of 
determining the sequence of layoffs must “bear the same characteristics as inverse 
seniority; must “be founded upon objectively-verifiable criteria unrelated to a 
teacher’s skills, abilities, or performance”). 
[92] Matthew Di Carlo, A Quality-Based Look at Seniority-Based Layoffs, 
Shanker Blog, Feb. 4, 2011, available athttp://shankerblog.org/?p=1791. 
[93] Id. 
[94] See Jonah Rockoff, The Impact of Individual Teachers on Student 
Achievement: Evidence from Panel Data, March 2003, http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe 
/papers/0304/0304002.pdf; Matthew Di Carlo, The Teaching Experience, 
Shanker Blog, Nov. 18, 2010, available at http://shankerblog.org/?p=1319.  But 
see The New Teacher Project, The Case Against Quality-Blind Teacher Layoffs, 
Feb. 2011, available at: http://tntp.org/assets/documents/TNTP_Case_Against 
_Quality_Blind_Layoffs_Feb2011.pdf?files/TNTP_Case_Against_Quality_Blind
_Layoffs_Feb2011.pdf. 
[95] See Ill. Ass’n of School Adm’rs, Performance Counts Act of 2010 – Draft 
Legislation, 1 (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.iasaedu.org/images/stories/Per for 
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mance%20Counts%20Act%20of%202010_final(1).pdf. It was unclear what 
factors other than those listed could be used in determining performance. 
[96] See Press Release, Ill. Fed’n of Teachers, Ill. Educ. Ass’n and Chi. Teachers 
Union, Accountability for All: A New Way Forward for Illinois Students (Jan 3. 
2012) (http://www.ift-aft.org/Libraries/Documents/IEAIFTCTUSUMMARY-
FINAL_1.sflb.ashx); seealso Press Release, Ill. Fed’n of Teachers, Ill. Educ. Ass’n 
and Chi. Teachers Union, Educators Will Proposed ‘Accountability for All’ 
Education Reform Legislation (Jan. 3, 2012) (http://www.ift-aft.org/news/p 
ressreleases/11-01-03/Educators_Will_Propose_AccountabilityFor_All_Educa 
tion_Reform_Legislation.aspx. 
[97] See Dillon, supra note 51. 
[98] As mentioned earlier, see note 47, supra, PERA created an advisory 
committee, PEAC, which was charged with recommending to ISBE minimum 
standards for all new evaluation plans and the content of the State model, to which 
districts would default if they couldn’t through their joint PERA committees reach 
agreement.  While at the time of the SB 7 negotiations PEAC had not yet made any 
recommendations on what tests and other assessments might be used to measure 
student growth and teacher classroom performance, its discussions were going 
toward the likely creation of several groups of assessments from which a district 
and its teachers could select and more rigorous objective requirements on what 
evaluators would need to support their observations of teachers. 
[99] Regenstein, supra note 8, at 16. 
[100] For each type of teaching position, state law establishes the state-issued 
teaching certificate and additional qualifications, such as endorsements and 
coursework, that a teacher must have.  These qualifications are called “legal 
qualifications,” and have been used in layoffs to determine what positions a teacher 
is qualified to hold. PC and school management wanted districts which, for 
example, had, a significant number of ESL (English as a Second Language) 
students, to be able to add ESL coursework or endorsement as an additional 
qualification for holding a position. More information on certification and legal 
qualifications from ISBE is available at http://www.isbe.state.il.us/certi 
fication/requirements/toc.htm. 
[101] See Illinois School Code § 24-12(b), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(b). Teachers in the 
lowest performance group are laid off first and at the discretion of the 
district.  Teachers in the second lowest performance group are further grouped by 
the average of their last two evaluations and then sorted by seniority within those 
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subgroups.  Teachers in the two highest performance groups are sorted by 
seniority, with teachers in the highest group the least vulnerable to layoff.  If a 
school district fails to evaluate a teacher, who has already received at least one 
evaluation, in a year in which such an evaluation is due, then the teacher will be 
deemed to have received a proficient evaluation for RIF-grouping purposes. 
See id § 24-12(d), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d). 
[102] See Illinois School Code § 24-12(c), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(c). This joint 
committee is similar to the PERA joint committee, see notes 46 – 47, supra, and 
accompanying text, except that its decisions are made by majority vote while the 
PERA committee’s decisions are made by consensus. Every school district was 
required to hold the first meeting of its joint committee no later than Dec. 1, 2011. 
[103] The law provides that if the joint committee agrees to modify the criteria, a 
school district is bound by that agreement, unless the joint committee agrees to 
change it. See Illinois School Code § 24-12(c), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(c).  Even after the 
first year of a joint committee’s existence, it is important for that committee to 
continue to meet annually to assess whether group criteria need to be modified. 
[104] This will likely be an annual responsibility of the joint committee, providing 
an additional reason why the committee should continue to meet every year. 
[105] See PERA/SB 7 Guidance, supra note 41, at FAQ E-42 and E-43. See also 
Hancon v. Bd. of Educ. of Barrington Community Unit School Dist. No. 220, 130 
Ill.App.3d 224, 474 N.E.2d 407 (2d Dist. 1985). 
[106] To agree to this the unions required that any additional qualifications be 1) 
clearly established and formalized so that they applied to all rather than some 
teachers teaching in a particular position and 2) known far enough in advance so 
teachers would have the ability to meet them in time to remain qualified.  Thus, 
the job description and May 10th requirements are in the law. 
[107] Even though these districts are not required to begin using the new layoff 
criteria and procedures until their collective bargaining agreements expire, they 
are still required to hold the first meeting of their joint committees by Dec. 1, 2011. 
Illinois School Code § 24-12(c), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(c). 
[108] More information about this program, developed for IASA by Dr. Don White, 
Superintendent, Troy Community Consolidated School District 30-C, is available 
at http://www.iasasurveys.org. 
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[109] SB 7 specifically provides, “A teacher’s grouping and ranking on a sequence 
of honorable dismissal shall be deemed a part of the teacher’s performance 
evaluation, and that information may be disclosed to the exclusive bargaining 
representative as part of a sequence of dismissal list, notwithstanding laws 
prohibiting disclosure of such information.” Illinois School Code § 24-12(b), 105 
ILCS 5/24-12(b).  The laws which prohibit the disclosure of teacher evaluations are 
Section 24A-7.1 of the School Code, 105 ILCS 5/24A-7.1 (“Except as otherwise 
provided under this Act, disclosure of public school teacher, principal, and 
superintendent performance evaluations is prohibited”) and Section 11 of the 
Personnel Records Review Act, 820 ILCS 40/11 (“This Act shall not be construed 
to diminish a right of access to records already other provided by law, provided 
that disclosure of performance evaluations under the Freedom of Information Act 
shall be prohibited”). 
[110] See Piquard v. Board of Education of Pekin Community High School District 
No. 303, 242 Ill.App.3d 477, 610 N.E.2d 757 (3d Dist. 1993). 
[111] PERA/SB 7 Guidance, supra note 41. 
[112] See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
[113] Performance Counts, Put Student Well-Being at the Center of Contract 
Negotiations, Dec. 2010, available at http://performancecounts.org/sites/defau 
lt/files/page-down loads/student-well-being.pdf. However, the very testimony of 
Eden Martin, at the time President of the Civic Committee of the Commercial Club 
of Chicago, one of the organizations in PC, belies this characterization.  In his 
testimony to the Special House Committee on Education Reform in December 
2010, Mr. Martin characterized strikes as a “thermonuclear bomb,” admitting that 
“In the end…the [PC] proposal is designed to preclude a strike.” See http://www. 
ift-aft.org/qualityeducationreform/HearingUpdate 1217.aspx. 
[114] Professor Gerald Berendt, Written Testimony presented to the Special House 
Committee on Education Reform, December 2010 (copy on file with author). 
Professor Berendt, former chairman of the IELRB, testified on the proposed 
amendments to the IELRA as follows: 
The proposed amendments do more than restrict the right of educational 
employees and their labor organizations to strike legally.  The amendments would 
effectively eliminate the legal strike except in the most unusual situa- 
tions.  Educational employers, would soon learn to play the new system, with the 
fact-finding process quickly becoming a perfunctory exercise, a mere hurdle to the 
end game provided in proposed Section 12(c)(7).  Instead of encouraging good 
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faith bargaining, the new process would encourage surface bargaining and reward 
bad faith.   Educational employers would go through the motions of bargaining, 
exhaust the fact-finding steps and then impose terms on the bargaining unit. 
The narrowing and virtual elimination of the legal right to strike may not be the 
most dramatic effect of these proposed amendments.  Without a legal right to 
strike, public education labor relations will predictably revert to the conditions 
which led to the passage of the IELRA in the first place.  Those of us who 
experienced those conditions understand that this will lead to the disappearance 
of the collaborative collective bargaining process we have enjoyed for the many 
years since the Educational Labor Relations Act went into effect in 
1984.  Restricting or eliminating the legal right to strike and permitting 
educational employers to impose terms will neither promote constructive 
collective bargaining, nor reduce the number of strikes. 
I am confident that the amendments to the Educational Labor Relations Act would 
actually increase the number of public teacher strikes in Illinois.  The strikes would 
be illegal under the amended IELRA and striking teachers and their unions would 
risk the consequences provided in the amendments. However, these penalties 
would no more deter such strikes than the more serious penalties, including 
incarceration, deterred pre-Act strikes in Illinois or elsewhere, such as in Detroit. 
Why, you may ask, would teachers be more likely to strike under the amended 
Act?  The amended Act would so skew the bargaining ratio in favor of educational 
employers, free to impose terms unilaterally, that unions would be forced to strike, 
albeit illegally, in order to level the playing field.  Unions would have to strike to 
get management to take their bargaining proposals seriously.  Put simply, 
collaborative, bilateral determination of wages, hours and terms of conditions of 
employment is not possible without a credible provision for resort to self-help. 
Eliminating the legal right to strike actually increases the reasons for unions to 
strike.  Under the present law, unions strike principally in order to extract 
concessions in bargaining.  If these amendments pass, unions will additionally feel 
the need to strike in order to bring the employer to the table in a meaningful 
way.  In effect, unions will be compelled to reestablish their credibility as effective 
bargaining agents for the employees they are privileged to represent.  There will be 
many, many more strikes in the nature of recognition strikes. Comparison of the 
pre-IERA strike statistics with the post- Act strike statistics clearly and 
overwhelmingly establishes this. 
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Finally, if teachers are essential public employees in the same category as police 
and firefighters, why not substitute interest arbitration for the right to strike?  This 
would be a more effective device for reducing or eliminating the public education 
strike because such systems encourage good faith bargaining and do not permit 
the employer to impose terms unilaterally.  However, it appears that the true 
purpose of the amendments is not to reduce the number of teacher strikes, which 
have been much fewer since the right to strike was recognized in 1984.  The 
proponents’ true purpose is apparently to diminish the collective bargaining right 
and process, seeking to return to “the good old days” when educational employers 
either had no unions representing their employees or, if they did, could ignore 
them.  And as I have already laid out, such a return to the pre-Act conditions will 
only lead to more strikes and undermine the collaborative collective bargaining 
process that has served the best interests of all concerned for the past quarter 
century.  The bitterness of such strikes lasts long after they end and pollute the 
labor management atmosphere in a manner that cannot help but damage the 
delivery of educational services to students. 
Professor Berendt’s testimony was extremely helpful in assisting the committee’s 
understanding of the effect of the PC proposals. 
[115] Even in the face of data which clearly showed that strikes had dramatically 
decreased over the years, PC and others, including several legislators, alleged that 
that data was essentially irrelevant.  They claimed that just the threat that a union 
could strike so scared school districts that they readily agreed to union bargaining 
demands which hurt their districts. Unions used the threat to their advantage and 
to the disadvantage of districts and students. As SFC Executive Director Jonah 
Edelman stated, “Because of the imbalance in the current way contracts are 
negotiated, the threat of a strike has been unfortunately used as a trump card to 
prevent key educational issues from being discussed and progress being made, and 
the most prominent case in point is student learning time.”  Agreement Close on 
Education Reform, LINCOLN DAILY News, April 7, 2011, available a thttp://arc hiv 
es.lincolndailynews.com/2011/Apr/07/News/today040711_e.shtml. Of course, 
no empirical data was presented to support this position.  Nor could they answer 
why, if the strike threat forced districts to agree to bargaining demands not in their 
best interest, a significant number of unions had agreed, for example, to salary 
and/or benefit freezes/cut backs, in recent bargaining. See Illinois State Board of 
Education, Illinois Teacher Salary Study 2012-2011, April 2011, at Table 3, 
available at http://www.isbe.net/research/pdfs/teacher_salary_10-11.pdf. 
[116] See Agreement Close on Education Reform, Illinois Statehouse News, April 
6, 2011, available at http://www.foxillinois.com/news/top-stories/Agreement-
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close-on-education-reform-119353709.html. In depth discussion of possible 
IELRA changes first occurred at the committee meeting on April 7, 2011, just one 
week before any legislation had to be passed by the Senate, as it had an April 15 
deadline. 
[117] Mayor-elect Rahm Emanuel had made increasing the length of the CPS 
school day a top priority.  And with the CPS-CTU collective bargaining agreement 
expiring in 2012, he was concerned about the possibility of a strike, even though 
CTU had not gone out on strike since 1987. See Regine Schlesinger, Teachers 
Union President: Strike is Possible, WBBM Radio, June 16, 2011, available 
at http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2011/06/16/teachers-union-president-strike-is-
possible/. 
[118] Performance Counts, supra note 113. 
[119] The School Management Alliance was also wary of such a proposal. 
[120] The unions found particular support for their belief in the work of Professor 
Martin Malin on the negative consequences to the bargaining process of mandated 
fact-finding, first published in 1993,  Public Employees’ Right to Strike: Law and 
Experience, 26 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 313 (1993). Professor Malin also provided the 
following email, dated April 11, 2011, to Mitchell Roth, which the unions shared 
with those involved in the negotiations: 
Thank you for sharing with me the proposals to amend the Illinois Educational 
Labor Relations Act and for soliciting my input.  I am deeply troubled by the 
proposals that would require or allow one party to require factfinding and rejection 
of the factfinder’s award as a prerequisite to a lawful strike.  Requiring pre-strike 
factfinding is a poor policy choice. 
I performed what I believe is the only major empirical study of the use of pre-strike 
factfinding in the public sector.  The study was published as, “Public Employees’ 
Right to Strike: Law and Experience,” 26 University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform 313 (1993).  Here is a link to the study.  http://works.bepress.com/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=martin_malin. The empirical analysis 
of pre-strike factfinding is found at pages 379-395.  I found that strikes which occur 
after mandated pre-strike factfinding are harder to settle and last significantly 
longer than strikes which occur without mandated pre-strike factfinding.  First, I 
compared the duration of strikes in Illinois and Ohio.  Both states lawfully 
recognized a right to strike for their public employees in 1984.  Ohio mandated pre-
strike factfinding and rejection of the factfinder’s recommendations for a strike to 
be lawful.  Illinois mandated mediation but not factfinding.  I found that most 
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strikes in Illinois settled within 10 days and Illinois strikes rarely lasted longer than 
30 days.  In contrast, most strikes in Ohio went longer than 10 days and a 
significant minority lasted longer than 30 days.  Overall, the differences in strike 
duration were significant at the .01 confidence level, i.e., they were 99% likely not 
to have occurred by chance. 
I followed up with further analysis of the Ohio data.  In Ohio, parties could agree 
on a mutually agreed-on dispute resolution procedure (known by the acronym 
MAD) and the MADs generally did away with the factfinding step.  So, I compared 
the duration of strikes in Ohio under the statutory procedure to the duration of 
strikes in Ohio under MADs without factfinding and found again that the strikes 
following factfinding were lengthier than the strikes under MADs.  The differences 
in strike duration were significant at the 0.025 confidence level, that is they were 
97.50% likely not to have occurred by chance. 
I then looked at Pennsylvania.  Under Pennsylvania law at the time, the 
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board had the discretion to impose factfinding as a 
prerequisite to a lawful strike.  The PLRB’s practice was to only impose factfinding 
where the mediator or the parties suggested that it could help.  In other words, the 
PLRB practice provided a built-in selection bias in the data favoring 
factfinding.  Despite this, the data showed again that strikes following pre-strike 
factfinding were longer than strikes without pre-strike factfinding.  The results 
were significant at the .05 confidence level, i.e., they were 95% likely not to have 
occurred by chance. 
I was not surprised that strikes following factfinding are harder to settle and last 
longer than strikes without factfinding.  Factfinding and rejection by one party of 
the factfinder’s recommendations further polarizes the parties and further hardens 
positions.  The process is an adjudicatory one which means it is an adversarial 
proceeding.  One party has indicated its willingness to accept the factfinder’s 
recommendations while the other party has rejected them and all of this has been 
made public.  The party that was willing to accept the recommendations will 
understandably harden its position saying, “Why should I make any more 
movement.  I am willing to accept what the neutral said was reasonable even 
though I don’t agree with it.  The other side is being unreasonable.  I won’t make a 
move.”  The fact that all of this happens in public makes it that much more difficult 
to get the party that was willing to accept the factfinder’s recommendations to 
move.  Moreover, the party that rejected the recommendation has its rejection 
made public and it too will be more resistant to movement lest it look to the public 
that it is admitting that its rejection was unreasonable or otherwise a mistake.  It 
is a mediator’s nightmare. 
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Factfinding can reduce the incidence of strikes but the data from Ohio showed that 
this occurred primarily because the parties failed to reject the recommendations in 
time.  (The Ohio statute required a vote by 60% of the union membership or 60% 
of the employer’s governing body to reject; otherwise, the recommendations were 
deemed accepted.  The bill recently signed by the Ohio Governor reduces this to 
50% but that bill may be stayed by the referendum effort currently ongoing in 
Ohio.)  In such cases, factfinding functions like interest arbitration.  But a major 
drawback of interest arbitration is its inherently conservative nature.  Interest 
arbitrators place a heavy burden on any party that wants to change the status 
quo.  Consequently, negotiating for innovative approaches under an interest 
arbitration regime is much more difficult than negotiating for innovative 
approaches under a right-to-strike regime.  A study published last year by Tom 
Kochan of MIT is the latest confirmation of this.  Consequently, I concluded in my 
1993 study: 
“Reliance on mandatory pre-strike factfinding to reduce strikes is a policy that is 
damned if it works and damned if it fails.  To the extent that it succeeds in 
preventing strikes, it functions considerably like interest arbitration.  As with 
interest arbitration, strikes are prevented at a cost of innovation and problem 
solving in bargaining.  When it fails, it introduces new issues into the bargaining 
process, hardens attitudes and makes compromises more difficult.  Although many 
factors may contribute to the duration of a particular strike, requiring prestrike 
factfinding increases the likelihood of longer strikes.  Thus, mandating prestrike 
factfinding does not appear to be a sound policy.” 
Although my study is 18 years old, I have not seen any developments in the past 
two decades that would lead me to believe that my conclusions no longer 
hold.  Moreover, I have particular concerns with introducing a pre-strike 
factfinding mandate in Illinois. 
The Illinois experience has been very positive.  My study found that the incidence 
of strikes actually declined after they were legalized.  The legalization of public 
employee strikes certainly did not result in an increase of strike activity even 
though there was a large increase in public employee collective bargaining.  In the 
current recession, strikes are almost non-existent. 
Last fall, I presented a seminar for State of Illinois attorneys cosponsored by the 
Governor’s Office and the Attorney General’s Office.  At that time, I reviewed the 
recent strike data.  In 2008-09, there was only 1 strike in public education and it 
lasted 1 day.  There were only 11 strike notices.  In 2009-10, there were only 4 
strikes but one was at U of I.  So, in K-12 education, there were 3 strikes and only 
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13 strike notices.  The 3 strikes lasted 4, 16 and 3 days.  In 2010-11, as of the date 
of my presentation, there had been 2 strikes (2 days and 3 days) and 10 strike 
notices.  In other words, since the recession hit, there have been only 6 strikes in 
K-12 education in this state and all but one were settled in less than a week. 
The experience noted above is understandable.  Unlike the private sector where a 
strike may shut an employer down and interrupt its revenue stream, when public 
employees strike, their employers continue to collect taxes.  In K-12 education, as 
long as enough strike days are made up to meet the 180-day school year, the school 
district suffers no reduction in state aid and the strikers, of course, suffer no loss 
of income to the extent that strike days are made up.  Thus, unlike the private 
sector strike whose effects and pressure are primarily economic, the public sector 
strike’s effect and pressure are primarily political.  I think it is clear that public 
employee unions correctly recognize that a strike in the current environment 
would generate political backlash against the union rather than political pressure 
against the employer.  Unions have little if any bargaining leverage from a strike 
threat today and they realize it, as reflected in not only the very small number of 
strikes but also the very small number of strike notices. 
I fear that mandating pre-strike factfinding could tempt some unions to try to get 
favorable factfinding recommendations which they can use for leverage in the 
bargaining process.  They may succeed or they may not but they will turn a 
negotiation process into an adversarial adjudicatory proceeding or will use the 
threat of doing so in an effort to replace the leverage that their strike threat no 
longer carries.  In these challenging fiscal environments that our school districts 
face, we don’t need to inject the ability to engage in such gamesmanship to distract 
the parties from a cooperative mutual problem-solving approach to collective 
negotiations.  In Illinois, we have, over the years, discouraged such game 
playing.  For example, when the IERLA was first enacted, unions and school 
districts played games with the mediation process.  When one party had greater 
resources than the other, it had a tendency to refuse to join the other party in a 
request to FMCS to mediate forcing the matter to a private mediator and imposing 
on the party with the weaker resources the burden of paying one-half of the 
mediator’s fee.  Fortunately, in the mid-1980s, we amended the IELRA to provide 
that if a party refuses to join the other party’s request for FMCS to mediate, the 
refusing party must pay the entire fee of the private mediator.  That ended those 
games.  Why should we now inject factfinding and start the game playing all over 
again? 
Over the years some have suggested that just having the right to strike distorts the 
public sector collective bargaining process because the strike is so powerful a 
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weapon.  This view received prominence in the classic book by Wellington and 
Winter, The Unions and the Cities, published by the Brookings Institution in 
1971.  This view has only existed in theory – it has become a bit of an urban 
myth.  Experience tells us that public officials do not roll over and cave in to union 
demands backed by threat of strike.  As I noted above, in the current environment, 
unions appear to recognize that strike threats are hollow – they are not even taking 
the ministerial step of filing strike notices to any significant degree. 
I am also concerned that the neutrals in Illinois have little to no experience with 
factfinding.  A factfinder has to negotiate a delicate balance between two 
conflicting roles.  On the one hand, a goal of factfinding is to lead to settlement.  In 
this regard, a factfinder is looking for a recommendation that both parties are likely 
to find acceptable.  On the other hand, if there is no settlement, the 
recommendation will be made public and in this regard the factfinder needs to 
present a completely objective analysis much like an interest arbitrator.  I suspect 
we will have a bit of a learning curve for most neutrals who practice in Illinois in 
adjusting to this conflicted role. 
My comments are based on my 3 decades of experience teaching, researching and 
writing about public sector labor relations and labor law as well as my experience 
as a participant in public sector labor relations as a neutral and as a consultant.  I 
served as a consultant to the Illinois public sector labor boards when the statutes 
first took effect and drafted their regulations implementing the statutes.  I have 
mediated and arbitrated numerous disputes in the public sector in Illinois and 
elsewhere and have served as a reporter to the Association of Labor Relations 
Agencies, the organization of labor boards and mediation agencies at the federal, 
state, provincial and local levels in the United States and Canada.  My book, Public 
Sector Employment: Cases and Materials (West 2004, 2nd ed. 2011) is the primary 
law school casebook on public sector labor law.  I currently serve, by appointment 
of President Obama, as a Member of the Federal Service Impasses Panel, which 
resolves impasses in collective bargaining between federal agencies and the unions 
that represent those agencies’ employees. 
Thank you for the opportunity to provide input.  Feel free to share my comments 
with others involved in the legislative discussions. 
Professor Malin’s statement was critical to the resolution of this issue. 
[121] Such school districts include all charter schools, whether in Chicago or 
elsewhere. Charter schools explicitly fall within the Section 2(a) definition of 
“educational employer” or “employer” for purposes of Sections 12(a), (c) and (d) of 
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the IELRA and within the scope of the Section 2(a) of the IELRA term “public 
school district” for purposes of Section 12(a-5) of the IELRA. The only entity which 
is exempted from Section 12(a-5) is a public school district organized under Article 
34 of the School Code, i.e., CPS.  And while charter schools fall within the term 
“public school district,” charter schools in Chicago are not organized under Article 
34; they are organized under Article 27A of the School Code. 
[122] PC and the legislators believed that mandatory fact-finding needed to be 
required in CPS.  This belief was driven by the concern they had over the large-
scale community and school district disruption a strike could have, the complexity 
of the issues in CPS, the history of CTU strikes (again even though one had not 
occurred in almost 25 years) and the feared militancy of newly-elected CTU 
President Karen Lewis.  Additionally, these concerns where shared by newly-
elected Mayor Emanuel, which undoubtedly played a major role. 
[123] See IELRA § 12(a-5), 115 ILCS 5/12(a-5). 
[124] 115 ILCS 5/2(a). 
[125] Or. Rev. Stat. § 243.712. 
[126] See IELRA § 13(a)(2), 115 ILCS 5/13(a)(2). 
[127] 115 ILCS 5/12(a-5). 
[128] In fact Section 12 of the IELRA is broadly entitled “Impasse procedures,” and 
includes the word “impasse” several times in its text, e.g., the ability of either part 
to initiate mediation within 45 days (changed to within 90 days under SB 7) if “the 
parties engaged in collective bargaining have reached an ‘impasse’….” 115 ILCS 
5/12. No one has ever successfully argued that use of the term “impasse” has meant 
that the employer, at that point in time, could unilaterally implement its last 
bargaining positions on unresolved issues. 
[129] 4 PERI 1136 (IELRB 1988). 
[130] Under Kewanee, the IELRB looks at the “totality of circumstances,” 
including: bargaining history, the good faith of the parties, the length of 
negotiations, the importance of the issues as to which there is no agreement, and 
the contemporaneous understanding of the parties.  Those involved in discussing 
and drafting this subsection (a-5) never expressed the intention that use of these 
terms was meant to change existing IELRB law. 
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[131] The Oregon statute upon which subsection (a-5) was in significant part 
modeled explicitly provides that an employer may not unilaterally implement all 
or part of its posted final offer at least until the posting period has been 
completed.  Or. Rev. Stat. § 243.712 (2)(d). 
[132] The time period for a party to petition the IELRB to initiate mediation was 
changed from within 45 to within 90 days of the start of the school year, and the 
time period for the IELRB to invoke mediation if the parties haven’t requested it 
was changed from within 15 days to within 45 days of the start of the school 
years.  The parties can still stipulate, however, to defer mediation.  115 ILCS 
5/12(a). 
[133] While CTU is the primary union of CPS employees, the changes also apply to 
other unions which represent CPS employees under the IELRA. 
[134] For reasons why CPS and CTU were treated differently, see supra note 122. 
[135] This requirement does not apply to either charter schools within Chicago, 
which are covered under the public posting requirements of Section 12(a-5) of the 
IELRA, or higher education institutions in Chicago.  See 115 ILCS 5/12(a-10)(1). 
[136] See supra note 62. 
[137] See Section 12(a-10) of the IELRA, 115 ILCS 5/12(a-10). If the parties have 
not reached agreement with 75 days after the fact-finding panel is appointed, the 
panel will issue its report, including findings and recommendations, privately to 
the parties. If within 15 days either party files notice with rationale rejecting the 
panel’s report, the panel will make the report and the rejection public.  The union 
then has to wait 30 days until it can strike. See Section 13(a)(2.5), 115 ILCS 
5/13(a)(2.5). 
[138] See supra note 83.  When originally drafted, SB 7 included language which 
arguably would have required a 3/4ths vote of all bargaining unit members to 
strike instead of bargaining unit members who are also members of the union. 
[139] Some have speculated that the acceptance by the unions of these changes was 
all part of PC’s plan to “drive a wedge” between the unions, leaving PC’s main 
concern, CTU, vulnerable.  See Michael Zucker, A Model for the Nation: How 
Performance Counts Did the Impossible and Reformed Illinois Schools, December 
2011, available at http://www.phoenixworks.org/PLSC260/ZuckerM.pdf: 
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Edelman argues [in his presentation In June 2011 at the Aspen 
Institute, see supra note 54] that the Performance Counts coalition drove a wedge 
between the more ‘pragmatic’ IEA and the more radical IFT/CTU.  When the issue 
of collective bargaining arose, the Performance Counts coalition had several 
fallback positions prepared from their original proposal, and decided to exploit the 
split between the unions.  Having demonstrated the capability to affect the 
structure of collective bargaining – which Edelman called the ‘primary’ concern of 
a union – the Performance Counts coalition brought the largely downstate-focused 
IEA to its side by focusing solely on Chicago.  With Karen Lewis, the head of CTU, 
being urged by both the IEA and Lightford to take the deal, she caved – electing 
the 75% threshold over binding arbitration – and thus producing the theoretical 
right to strike. 
Whether this was all part of PC’s plan, the unions will not speculate.  If it was, 
however, it was the antithesis of how those actually involved in the SB 7 
negotiations, including those from PC (which except for one meeting, didn’t 
include Mr. Edelman), acted. While differences certainly existed, the approach by 
all was respectful, sincere, interest-based and collaborative.  As a record of what 
truly took place, it is pure fiction and promotional puffery, as subsequently 
acknowledged by Mr. Edelman in an apology he sent to all involved.  His apology 
is available at http://www.ieanea.org/media/2011/07/Jonah-Edelman-emailed-
apology-6-10.pdf.  No wedge was driven between the unions on this issue. Quite to 
the contrary, all the unions worked closer together and in more common purpose 
than they ever had before.  Both the IEA and IFT supported whatever the CTU 
believed was in its best interest. 
[140] CTU believes that the 75% vote of all union members in the bargaining unit 
is not an insurmountable hurdle.  See, e.g., Sarah Karp, For the Record: Chicago 
Teachers Union Strike Votes, Catalyst Chicago, July 11, 2011, available 
at http://www.catalyst-chicago.org/notebook/2011/07/11/record-chicago-teach 
ers-union-strike-votes. 
[141] 115 ILCS 5/4.5(a). For school districts in the remainder of the state, the 
decision on the length of the school day is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining.  Heyworth School Dist. No. 3, 1 PERI 1182 (IELRB 1985). 
[142] In fall 2011, the IELRB issued a complaint, for which it was prepared to seek 
an injunction, against CPS for attempting to increase the length of the school day 
at several schools. Chicago Bd. of Educ., Case No. 2012-CA-0009-C (Oct. 13, 2011), 
available at http://www.ctunet.com/blog/text/2012-CA-0009-C-ULP-Complai 
nt-Notice-of-Hearing-Coerced-Concessions-without-fax.pdf. The matter was 
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settled by CTU and CPS. See Teachers’ Union, Chicago School Officials Settle 
Legal Dispute over Length of School Day, National School Boards Association 
Legal Clips, Nov., 8, 2011, available at http://legalclips.nsba.org/?p=10095. 
[143] Section 12(b) of the IELRA provides that the parties are required to resolve 
their dispute or impasse through an agreed-upon dispute resolution procedure 
which includes a rotating mediation panel which may, at the request of either 
party, issue advisory findings of fact and recommendations.  115 ILCS 5/12(b). CPS 
and CTU have had an agreement setting up such a procedure since 2003, when 
this language was added to the IELRA.  See also CPS-SEIU Local 73 2007-2012 
Collective Bargaining Agreement, App. C, Mediation Process Under Section 4.5 of 
the IELRA, available at  http://www.cps-humanresources.org/Employee/Fo 
rms/UnionCont/Local73/Local%2073%20%28full%20with%20bookmarks%29. 
pdf. 
[144] At the time, CPS and CTU were involved in litigation before the IELRB and 
state courts.  The issue was whether the IELRB had jurisdiction to hear alleged 
union discrimination and bad faith bargaining ULPs stemming from negotiations 
regarding wage increases under the existing collective bargaining agreement and 
CPS’s decision to lay off teachers (a permissive subject of bargaining under section 
4.5 of the IELRA), when CTU did not agree to forgo such increases. The IELRB 
issued a complaint, see Chicago Teachers Union and Chicago Bd. of Educ., No. 
2011-CA-0033-C (IELRB 2011), which CPS unsuccessfully attempted to block 
through the courts, arguing that the IELRA did not have jurisdiction over the 
matter, as any dispute or impasse involving the layoff decision was subject to the 
dispute resolution process set forth in sections 4.5(b) and 12(b) of the IELRA. See 
Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. IELRB, 28 PERI ¶ 42, 2011 Ill.App. 
(1st) 111696 (August 22, 2011) (holding that the IELRB and not the court has the 
jurisdiction to interpret the IELRA to determine whether the ULP procedures of 
section 15 or the alternative dispute resolution procedures of section 4.5(b) and 
12(b) apply).  PC-proposed language, which was written by CPS and would have 
undercut the IELRB and CTU in this pending litigation, had been included in SB 7 
when it passed the Senate in April 2011, because those who drafted the final Senate 
language did not know of the pending litigation.  This led to the problems 
regarding the unions’ support of SB 7 in May 2011, which resulted in the 
compromise language included in the final legislation passed by both houses. See 
supra notes 83, 86 for further discussion of this issue. 
[145] In 2008, the unions and school management worked together to propose a 
streamlining of the dismissal process, that was included in Senate Amendment 6 
to SB 2288.  Unfortunately, that bill, which also included an income tax increase 
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and many of the education reform concepts which had been proposed in the 
original Burnham Plan, did not pass.  See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying 
text. 
[146] This had not been an issue in CPS since 1995, when the law was changed so 
that the independent hearing officer did not make the final decision on whether a 
teacher was dismissed, but only made a recommendation to the district, which 
then made the final decision. See Illinois School Code § 34-85, 105 ILCS 5/34-85. 
[147] Many teachers did not appeal, as the unions advised them that their cases did 
not have sufficient merit. 
[148] The parties could agree to an alternative method of selecting a hearing 
officer, such as through the American Arbitration Association.  Illinois School 
Code § 24-12, 105 ILCS 24-12; Illinois School Code  34-85, 105 ILCS 5/34-85. 
[149] The law (section 24-12 of the School Code) provided that the hearing had to 
be scheduled before an independent hearing officer on a date no less than 15 nor 
more than 30 days after the school board passed a motion to dismiss the 
teacher.  Practically, that scheduling was a mere formality, and the actual start of 
the hearing was postponed for months. 
[150] Many of these matters, however, ended without a hearing, as the parties 
during the period of time between the school district’s act to dismiss the teacher 
and the start of the hearing would settle the matter.  Furthermore, the time delay 
often worked to the advantage of the school district, as during this period the 
teacher was not receiving any compensation.  While the teacher could receive back 
pay if successful in challenging the district’s dismissal decision, the pressure of not 
having income during the interim led to a good number of settlements. 
[151] The School Management Alliance approach closely resembled PC’s, but 
expanded it to cover conduct as well as performance dismissals. See supra notes 
64, 69. PC was just focused on the process by which teachers were dismissed for 
poor performance. 
[152] See Performance Counts, supra note 62. 
[153] For CPS, it turned one process into two because, as mentioned in note 142, 
since 1995 the hearing officer in CPS dismissal cases only makes a 
recommendation regarding dismissal rather than the decision. 
[154] See Illinois School Code § 24-16.5, 105 ILCS 5/24-16.5. 
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[155] See Illinois School Code §  24-12(d)(6), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d)(6). 
[156] See Illinois School Code § 24-16.5(d)(3), 105 ILCS 5/24-16.5(d)(3). Under all 
three dismissal processes, for good cause (as defined in the law) or by mutual 
agreement of the parties, the start and end of dates of a hearing or the number of 
days each party has to present their case can be modified.  The hearing officer also 
can modify on his own the time a party has to present its case.  See Illinois School 
Code §  24-12(d)(6), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d)(6); Illinois School Code §  24-16.5(a), 
105 ILCS 5/24-16.5(a); Illinois School Code §  34-85(a)(5), 105 ILCS 5/34-
85(a)(5). 
[157] Under the dismissal system in place for dismissals which occur on or before 
June 30, 2012, ISBE pays the full cost of the hearing officer.  See Illinois School 
Code §  24-12(d)(5), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d)(5); Illinois School Code §  34-85(a)(4), 
105 ILCS 5/34-85(a)(4). 
[158] CPS will no longer use an ISBE-provided list.  Instead, the list will now be 
developed by the school district in good faith consultation with CTU and 
CPAA.  See Illinois School Code § 34-85(a)(3), 105 ILCS 5/34-85(a)(3). 
[159] Illinois School Code § 24-12(d)(3)(ii), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d)(3)(ii). 
[160] This is essentially modeled after the system which has been used in CPS since 
1995. 
[161] See Illinois School Code § 24-12(d)(8), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d)(8). 
[162] See Illinois School Code §  24-12(d)(9), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d)(9). Without this 
safeguard, the court would only review the school district’s decision and not the 
contrary recommendation of the hearing officer.  See, e.g.,Hearne v. Bd. of Educ. 
of City of Chicago, 322 Ill.App.3d 467, 749 N.E.2d 411 (1st Dist. 2001). 
[163] See Illinois School Code §  24A-, 105 ILCS 5/24A-5. 
[164] See Illinois School Code §  24-16.5(c)(4, 105 ILCS 5/24-16.5(c)(4). 
[165] See Illinois School Code §  24-16.5(c)(3, 105 ILCS 5/24-16.5(c)(3). 
[166] See Illinois School Code §  24-16.5(c)(1) & (2), 105 ILCS 5/24-16.5(c)(1) & 
(2). 
[167] To remediate, the teacher must receive an evaluation of proficient or better 
at the end of the remediation period. 
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[168] This training will not be as comprehensive as the training all evaluators must 
successfully complete in order to conduct valid evaluations beginning September 
1, 2012.  See Illinois School Code §  24A-3(b), 105 ILCS 5/24A-3(b). 
[169] In the hearing, “the teacher may only challenge the substantive and 
procedural aspects of (i) the ‘unsatisfactory’ performance evaluation rating that led 
to the remediation, (ii) the remediation plan, and (iii) the final remediation 
evaluation.  To the extent the teacher challenges procedural aspects, including any 
in applicable collective bargaining agreement provisions, of a relevant 
performance evaluation rating or remediation plan, the teacher must demonstrate 
how an alleged procedural defect materially affected the teacher’s ability to 
demonstrate a level of performance necessary to avoid remediation or dismissal or 
successfully completed the remediation plan.  Without any such material effect, a 
procedural defect shall not impact the assessment by the hearing officer, board, or 
reviewing court of the validity of a performance evaluation or a remediation plan.” 
Illinois School Code §  24-16.5(d)(2)(B), 105 ILCS 5/24-16.5(d)(2)(B). Also, the 
hearing officer can only consider and weigh the original unsatisfactory evaluation 
which led to the teacher’s remediation and the evaluations given during and at the 
end of the remediation period. Illinois School Code §  24-16(d)(2)(C), 105 ILCS 
5/24-16.5(d)(2)(C). In a regular performance evaluation dismissal hearing, the 
foregoing restrictions do not for the most part exist.  Hearing officers have more 
discretion regarding what evidence to consider, which often does include, for 
example, the teacher’s evaluation history. 
[170] See Illinois School Code § 24-16.5(g), 105 ILCS 5/24-16.5(g). The standard 
on review is that the school district’s decision may be reverse only if it is found to 
be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with the 
law.  If the hearing officer did not recommend that the teacher be dismissed, but 
the district still dismissed her, the standard of review is whether the district’s 
decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
[171] See Illinois School Code §  24-11, 105 ILCS 5/24-11; Illinois School Code §  34-
84, 105 ILCS 5/34-84. 
[172] Contrary to popular myth, once a teacher acquires tenure she is not immune 
from being dismissed. Prior to SB 7, she was entitled to 1) employment from year 
to year unless laid off or dismissed for cause, 2) due process rights in the event of 
dismissal for cause and 3) priority over non-tenured teachers in a layoff.  With the 
passage of SB 7, the latter tenure benefit no longer exists, unless the teacher is 
covered by a grandfathered collective bargaining agreement. See Illinois School 
Code § 24-12(b), 105 ILCS 24-12(b). 
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[173] Prior to 1998, a teacher had to complete two consecutive years of full-time 
service and be re-employed for a third year in order to acquire tenure.  If the 
teacher had no prior teaching experience, a school district could extend the 
number of years to acquire tenure to three. 
[174] For the specific section in current law, see Illinois School Code §  24-11(f), 
105 ILCS 5/24-11(f). In CPS, it appears that written reasons are required for 
nonrenewals at the end of any probationary year.  See Illinois School Code §  34-
84, 105 ILCS 5/34-84. 
[175] See, e.g., Howard v. Bd. of Educ. of Freeport School Dist. No. 145, 160 
Ill.App.3d 309, 513 N.E.2d 545 (2d Dist., 1987); Burns v. Bd. of Educ. of Fairfield 
School Dist. No. 112 of Wayne County, 47 Ill.App.3d 589, 362 N.E.2d 353 (5th 
Dist., 1977); Wade v. Granite City Community Unit School Dist. No. 9, 71 
Ill.App.2d 34, 218 N.E.2d 19 (5th Dist. 1966). 
[176] The improvements to the performance evaluation process required by PERA 
were a critical factor in the unions’ position.  See supra notes 40-51 and 
accompanying text. 
[177] The School Management Alliance proposed to immediately begin tying 
evaluations to tenure acquisition. See supra notes 64, 69. 
[178] See, e.g., Senate Amendment 1 to SB 2686, 95th General Assembly, 
introduced in 2008, available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/95/SB/PDF 
/09500SB2686sam001.pdf. 
[179] See supra notes 62, 64 & 69 and accompanying text. 
[180] See supra note 45 for an explanation of the new four category evaluation 
ratings. 
[181] See Illinois School Code § 24-11(d)(1), 105 ILCS 5/24-11(d)(1).  If a school 
direct fails to evaluate a teacher in a given year, then the teacher will be deemed to 
have received a proficient evaluation for tenure acquisition purposes. See Illinois 
School Code §  24-11(d), 105 ILCS 5/24-11(d). 
[182] See Illinois School Code §  24-11(d), 105 ILCS 5/24-11(d). The parties also 
came to an agreement on what would constitute a school term for tenure 
acquisition purposes.  A nagging issue for districts, unions and teachers had been 
how many days must a teacher work for the school term to count.  In light of a 
2008 Appellate Court decision, Wood v. North Wamac School District No. 186, 
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368 Ill.App.3d 874, 899 N.E.2d 578 (5th Dist.) (school term in which teacher didn’t 
work but was on a paid leave of absence counted for tenure acquisition purposes), 
the parties all proposed statutorily defining the minimum number of days of work 
needed for a school term to count. They agreed that it would be 120 days (150 days 
in CPS), provided that days of Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave that a 
teacher is required to take until the end of a school term are to be considered days 
of work. Under the FMLA, a school district can delay a teacher’s return from FMLA 
leave at the end of a school term.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2618(d); 29 C.F.R. § 825.602. 
Furthermore, if a teacher falls below the 120 days minimum so the school term 
does not count for tenure acquisition purposes, that year will not be considered a 
break-in-service which would require the teacher to restart the time period for 
acquiring tenure, as long as the teacher returns to work in the school district the 
following school term. See Illinois School Code §  24-12(e), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(e); 
Illinois School Code §  34-84, 105 ILCS 5/34-84. 
[183] See supra note 69 for a comparison of the proposals. In addition, the teacher 
would have to be reemployed for the following school term in order for tenure to 
accrue. 
[184] See Illinois School Code § 24-11(d)(2), 105 ILCS 5/24-11(d)(2). 
[185] See supra note 69. 
[186] See Illinois School Code § 24-11(d)(3), 105 ILCS 5/24-11(d)(3). 
[187] As mentioned earlier, under existing law, if a school district nonrenews a 
teacher at the end of the fourth probationary year, it must provide specific written 
reasons for doing so. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
[188] There already are discussions on trailer legislation to clarify and tweak some 
parts of SB 7.  Furthermore, implementation of these laws may very well reveal 
provisions which should be modified. 
  




By, Student Editorial Board: 
Zachary Budden, Amanda Clark, Thomas Ryan, and Dustin Watkins  
Recent Developments is a regular feature of The Illinois Public Employee Relations 
Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public 
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the 
collective bargaining statutes and the Family Medical Leave Act. 
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS 
 
A.  Appropriate Bargaining Units 
 
In Board of Trustees of University of Illinois. v. IELRB, 2012 IL App (4th) 110836, 
2012 WL 966457 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. Mar. 22, 2012), the Illinois Appellate Court for 
the 4th District reversed the IELRB’s certification of UIC United Faculty, AFT-
IFT as the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit consisting of tenured, 
tenure-track, and non-tenure track faculty at the Chicago campus of the University 
of Illinois. The union had filed a majority-interest petition on April 29, 2011 with 
the IELRB proposing a bargaining unit consisting of both tenure-system faculty 
and non-tenure track faculty for the Chicago campus. An administrative law judge 
issued a recommended decision certifying the bargaining unit. A three-member 
majority of the IELRB rejected the university’s exceptions to the ALJ’s 
recommendation and, with one Board member dissenting, certified the union as 
the exclusive bargaining representative for the bargaining unit composed of tenure 
and non-tenure track faculty. The University appealed. 
The court observed that the first paragraph of IELRA § 7(a) directs the IELRB to 
make case-by-case determinations of the appropriateness of proposed bargaining 
units by considering several different factors. However, the second paragraph of § 
7(a) removes the Board’s authority to make case-by-case determinations for 
tenured and tenure-track faculty at each campus of the University of Illinois. 
Instead, the statute describes the “sole appropriate bargaining unit” for such 
faculty. The second paragraph of § 7(a) provides: 
The sole appropriate bargaining unit for tenured and tenure-track academic faculty at 
each campus of the University of Illinois shall be a unit that is comprised of non-
supervisory academic faculty employed more than half-time and that includes all tenured 
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and tenure-track faculty of that University campus employed by the board of trustees in 
all of the campus’s undergraduate, graduate, and professional schools and degree and 
non-degree programs (with the exception of the college of medicine, the college of 
pharmacy, the college of dentistry, the college of law, and the college of veterinary 
medicine, each of which shall have its own separate unit), regardless of current or 
historical representation rights or patterns or the application of any other factors. Any 
decision, rule, or regulation promulgated by the Board to the contrary shall be null and 
void. 
The issue before the court centered on the meaning of the following portion of the 
second paragraph of § 7(a): “a unit that is comprised of non-supervisory 
academic faculty employed more than half-time and that includes all tenured and 
tenure-track faculty of that University;” specifically the meaning of the two 
adjective clauses, the “that” clauses, in the quoted section of the statute. 
The IELRB argued the first adjective clause (“that is comprised of non-supervisory 
academic faculty employed more than half-time”) described the whole bargaining 
unit and the second adjective clause (“that includes all tenured and tenure-track 
faculty of that University campus”) described only a part of the whole unit. The 
university, however, interpreted the second adjective clause as referring to the 
entire bargaining unit; the unit must be composed of all the tenured and tenure-
track faculty of the campus, excluding all other employees. 
The IELRB argued that the university’s interpretation suffered from two major 
flaws. First, the university’s construction of the statute contradicted the ordinary 
meaning of the word “include.” The term “include” typically has a different 
meaning than the term “comprise;” “include” ordinarily means “to take in 
or comprise as a part of a whole” and to be “comprised of” means to “be 
composed of” or to “consist of.” The word “include” suggests the 
containment of something as constituent, component, or subordinate part of a 
larger whole. 
Second, the IELRB argued, if the first and second adjective clauses describe the 
entire bargaining unit, then it is unclear why both clauses were needed in the 
second paragraph of § 7(a). If the legislature intended “include” to have the same 
meaning as “is comprised of,” there is no explanation why the legislature used both 
verbs in consecutive clauses modifying the same predicate noun. The IELRB 
argued the natural inference from the legislature’s choice to use two different verbs 
is that the words were intended to have different meanings. 
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The university responded that if the word “includes” were given its plain meaning, 
referring to a “subset of a larger universe of possible items,” the sentence would be 
reduced to a tautology. The IELRB’s interpretation would make the phrase 
“includes tenured and tenure-track faculty” meaningless. Second, the university 
argued, the IELRB’s interpretation involved a fatal conflict. Section 7(a) sets out to 
define “the sole appropriate bargaining unit for tenured and tenure-track 
academic faculty;” however, under the IELRB’s interpretation, the statute 
describes different possible compositions of the bargaining unit. The university 
argued this interpretation was impermissible; the statute cannot be read to state 
the sole permissible bargaining unit may be one several different compositions. 
The court found both interpretations flawed, ultimately reaching the conclusion 
that the second paragraph of § 7(a) is ambiguous. The court reasoned that while 
the university’s interpretation avoided the conflict between the complete subject 
(“the sole bargaining unit”) and the subject complement (“a unit that is comprised 
of non-supervisory academic faculty employed more than half-time and that 
includes all tenured and tenure-track faculty of that University campus”), this 
interpretation required redefining the term “includes” to mean “is comprised of” 
even though the legislature used the two distinct terms in consecutive clauses. The 
IELRB’s interpretation, on the other hand, upheld the ordinary meaning of the two 
clauses, but at the cost of accepting a conflict between the complete subject and the 
subject complement. Finding both interpretations to be unsatisfactory, the court 
turned to the legislative history to help determine the meaning of the two adjective 
clauses. 
In 1996, § 7(a) was amended to add the second paragraph. Unlike the current 
language of § 7(a), when the second paragraph was added in 1996 it provided the 
only appropriate unit for faculty of the university was a unit including all tenured, 
tenure-track, and nontenure-track faculty. Since the three types of faculty 
comprise all possible faculty employed by the university, in the earlier version of 
the second paragraph “includes” could not mean “the containment of something 
as a constituent, component, or subordinate part of a larger whole,” but was used 
in a manner synonymous with “is comprised of.” 
On January 1, 2004 the second paragraph of § 7(a) was changed to the language at 
issue in this case. Section 7(a) no longer described the entire “academic faculty” of 
the university as a whole, but instead described the appropriate unit for “tenured 
and tenure-track faculty.” The court noted the amendment of a statute typically 
evinces a legislative intention to change the law, not to keep the law as it is. Further, 
logic suggests words left unchanged by an amendment are intended to have the 
same meaning as before. This lead the court to conclude that “includes” in the 
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current version of § 7(a) has the same meaning as in the prior version: “is 
comprised of.” By deleting the word “and nontenure-track” from the second 
adjective clause, the legislature intended to change the law by providing the sole 
appropriate bargaining unit for tenure and tenure-track faculty on a campus 
consists only of the tenured and tenure-track faculty on that campus. 
Finally, the Court found support for its assumption that nontenure-track faculty 
were not intended to be included in the permissible bargaining unit based on 
statements made by the bill’s sponsor. Comments made by the sponsor, Senator 
Maloney, only focused on the formation of bargaining units by tenured and tenure-
track faculty and did not mention nontenure-track faculty at all. This led the court 
to conclude the IELRB’s interpretation of § 7(a) was contrary to the legislative 
intent. 
The Court concluded, in light of the legislative history and the competing 
interpretations of the second paragraph of § 7(a), that the legislature intended the 
sole appropriate bargaining unit for tenured and tenure-track faculty at each 
campus to be exclusively comprised of all nonsupervisory tenured and tenure-
track faculty at the campus who were employed more than halftime. The Court 
reversed the IELRB’s certification of the bargaining unit including tenure and 
non-tenure-track faculty. 
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
 
A.  Duty to Supply Information 
 
In Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council and Illinois Secretary of State, 
S-CA-11-016 (ILRB State Panel 2012), the ILRB State Panel held that the Secretary 
of State did not breach its duty to bargain when it refused to provide the Illinois 
Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council (FOP) a copy of an audit report by the 
Office of Inspector General. 
The Inspector General audits all Secretary of State departments and distributes a 
final report to directors and administrators with a cover page indicating that it is a 
confidential document that should not be distributed to others. In 2008, the 
Inspector General audited the Secretary of State Department of Police. The report 
involved interviews with employees covering topics that included terms and 
conditions of employment such as scheduling, training, efficiency, equipment, 
safety, manpower, how to improve the department, and their thoughts about 
department operations.The FOP requested a copy of the audit report shortly after 
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the parties began negotiating a new contract. The Secretary of State refused to turn 
over the audit. Both, the ALJ and the State Panel agreed that the Secretary of 
State’s refusal did not violate § 10(a)(4) because the employer’s interest in 
maintaining confidentiality of the audit outweighed the FOP’s interest in a 
copy. The audit dealt with an internal assessment of the department’s operations 
and its value would be compromised if exposed to the general public. Most of the 
information, the decision noted, would also be available to the FOP through its 
members. 
The parties had also agreed to ground rules for the contract negotiations that stated 
that“both parties agree to exchange information or comply with reasonable 
requests for information as long as that information is available to the parties, at 
no cost.” The ALJ concluded that the refusal to provide the audit violated the 
parties’ ground rules, and the breach of the ground rules violated §§ 10(a)(4) 
and (1). The State Panel disagreed that the single failure to hand over the audit 
amounted to an unfair labor practice, relying on County of Kane (Kane County 
Sherriff), 4 PERI ¶2031 (IL SLRB 1988), which held that disputes over ground 
rules should not be permitted to deter negotiations over wages, hours and terms 
and conditions of employment. To allow a disruption to negotiations would 
compromise the policy of the Act to promote collective bargaining. The State Panel 
reversed this part of the ALJ’s decision. 
III.  FMLA DEVELOPMENTS 
 
A. State Sovereign Immunity 
 
In Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 132 S.Ct. 1327 (2012), the United 
States Supreme Court, with a four-justice plurality, held that states are immune 
from monetary damage lawsuits predicated on the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) provision that gives employees a right to leave to care for their own serious 
medical conditions – the FMLA’s self-care provision. 29 U.S.C § 2612(a)(1)(D) 
(2008). 
When Congress enacted the FMLA in 1993 it expressly authorized a cause of action 
against employers, including public employers, for violating or interfering with the 
rights the FMLA bestowed. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2). Such language purported to 
abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity to suits for money damages. However, 
prior decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Eleventh Amendment to the 
Constitution have held that Congress lacks authority to abrogate state sovereign 
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immunity when it acts pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce, but 
has such authority when it acts pursuant to its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to implement the Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the 
laws. 
Daniel Coleman was an employee of the Maryland Court of Appeals. After 
requesting sick leave, Mr. Coleman was given two choices:resignation or 
termination. Mr. Coleman sued the Maryland Court of Appeals for, inter alia, 
violating the FMLA’s self-care provision. The district court dismissed and the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Both held that as an entity of the 
sovereign State of Maryland, the Court of Appeals was immune from liability in an 
employee’s suit for damages. 
In addition to granting a right to leave for self-care, the FMLA grants a right to 
leave to care for family members with serious medical conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 
2612(a)(1)(C). In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs. 538 U.S. 721 
(2003), the Supreme Court upheld a right of action for family-care based damage 
suits, holding that the abrogation of states’ sovereign immunity was a valid of 
exercise of Congress’s enforcement power under § 5 the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Coleman plurality distinguished Hibbs, finding that with 
respect to the family care provision of the FMLA, Congress relied on clear, 
documented evidence of sex-based discrimination in family-leave policies. 
Justice Kennedy writing for the Coleman plurality noted that the Hibbs “holding 
rested on evidence that States had family-leave policies that differentiated on the 
basis of sex and that States administered even neutral family-leave policies in ways 
that discriminated on the basis of sex.”To Congress, and the Court, these 
documented practices constituted transgressions against the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s substantive equal protection guarantee against sex 
discrimination, including, “sex-role stereotyp[ing] that caring for family 
members is women’s work.” Therefore, in Hibbs, there was “a congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means 
adopted to that end,” as required by the Court’s prior decision in City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy noted, the legislative history for the FMLA’s 
self-care provision “reveals a concern for the economic burdens on the employee 
and the employee’s family resulting from illness-related job loss and a concern 
for discriminating on the basis of illness, not sex.” Furthermore, the legislative 
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record at the time of the FMLA’s enactment demonstrated that 95 to 96 percent 
of state employees were covered by a paid sick-leave or a short-term disability plan. 
As a result, evening assuming there existed a transgression in need of remedy, 
abrogating states’ immunity when existing policies were sufficient “is not a 
congruent and proportional remedy.” 
The plurality also rejected an argument that the self-care provision was a necessary 
adjunct to support the family-care provision. Justice Kennedy described the 
necessary adjunct argument as “supposition and conjecture.” Coleman’s final 
argument in support of State liability under the self-care provision invoked 
disparate impact against single parents, the majority of whom are women. To the 
plurality, however, disparate impact evidence of discrimination may be relevant, 
but “alone it is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation even where the 
Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to strict scrutiny.” 
Justice Ginsburg joined by Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor 
dissented. Justice Ginsburg criticized the plurality as paying “scant attention to 
the overarching aim of the FMLA.” To the dissenting Justices, text and legislative 
history revealed that Congress’s purpose with the self-care provision was to 
address sex discrimination in the workplace. Justice Ginsburg described the self-
care provision as one necessary to equal-treatment feminist concerns that without 
a gender-neutral self-care provision the FMLA’s authorization of self-care for 
pregnancy and childbirth-related medical issues would actually create an incentive 
for employers to discriminate in hiring women. Therefore, by including § 
2612(a)(1)(D)’s gender-neutral self-care provision, and thereby equalizing 
among the sexes the same possibility for twelve weeks of self-care leave, the FMLA 
serves to protect against discrimination against women, particularly child bearing 
women. Justice Ginsberg described the self-care provision as “an appropriate 
response to pervasive discriminatory treatment of pregnant women.” 
Justice Scalia, concurring only in the judgment, applauded both the plurality and 
the dissent for their respective “faithful application[s]” of the congruent and 
proportional test. Justice Scalia used the opposite outcomes derived from the 
plurality’s and the dissent’s application of the same analysis to criticize the 
Court’s congruence and proportionality jurisprudence as a “flabby test” ripe 
for “judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking.” Instead, Justice 
Scalia urged that an analysis of Congress’s power under § 5 be limited to “the 
regulation of conduct that itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment.” 
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Justice Thomas also concurred in the result. In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Thomas reiterated his view that Hibbs was wrongly decided. 
